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About the Creativity, Culture and
Education Literature Review Series
Creativity, Culture and Education (CCE) is a national charity with a vision for
all children, regardless of their background, to experience and access the
diverse range of cultural activities in England because these opportunities
can enhance their aspirations, achievements and skills. We promote the
value and impact of creative learning and cultural opportunities through our
strong evidence base and policy analysis, stimulating debate among policy
makers and opinion formers, and delivering front line, high quality
programmes. 
Through our research and evaluation programme, we promote a systemic
approach to creative and cultural initiatives and one which builds on the
excellent practice which already exists to make opportunity consistent, to
ensure that all children and young people are included and to place quality at
the core of any creative or cultural experience.
CCE’s work includes: 
• Creative Partnerships - England’s flagship creative learning programme 
fosters long-term partnerships between schools and creative
professionals to inspire, open minds and harness the potential of creative
learning. The programme has worked with just under 1 million children,
and over 90,000 teachers in more than 8,000 projects in England.
www.creative-partnerships.com
• Find Your Talent - how we can help children and young people to 
access arts and culture: www.findyourtalent.org 
Fostering creativity is fundamentally important because creativity brings with
it the ability to question, make connections, innovate, problem solve,
communicate, collaborate and to reflect critically. These are all skills
demanded by contemporary employers and will be vital for young people to
play their part in a rapidly changing world.
Our programmes can have maximum impact if teachers, parents, children,
young people and practitioners themselves learn from the experience and
activities delivered through the programmes. For this reason, one of the
most significant legacies will be the product of our research and evaluation
and how that is effectively communicated to stakeholders. 
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However, because Creativity, Culture and Education works by creating
partnerships drawn from the widest fields of endeavour, the different
stakeholders recognise that there is often a ‘knowledge gap’ between
reflection, analysis, and learning. In addition, the wide focus of approach –
which is fundamental to the nature of creativity – means that people are
often working at the limit of their disciplines. 
For these reasons we have commissioned a series of literature reviews
exploring the key issues in current literature and summarising the history
and latest developments in each subject. Each review is written by an
experienced and respected author in their field. They aim to be accessible,
clearly referenced and to act as ‘stepping-stone’ resources to underpin the
research conducted by and for Creativity, Culture and Education.
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Foreword
This report surveys the literature focusing on the history and theory of the
cultural and creative industries. It was originally published three years ago,
by the Creative Partnerships team at the Arts Council. The programme and
team have since been transferred to a new organisation, Creativity, Culture
and Education (CCE) and, the report is now being republished in the new
CCE format and circulated to new partners and participants in its
programmes. In this second edition, Professor O’Connor has taken this
opportunity to write a new conclusion reflecting on how changes in web 2.0
and mobile communication technologies have affected the debates around
the creative industries and our understanding of art, culture and economy.
The main body of the literature review explores both the history of the idea of
the cultural industries and how this has changed and developed our current
interest in the creative economy. It focuses on the conceptual ideas behind
thinking in this area and lays out the reasons behind the shifts in terminology
and policy. It is especially relevant to the broader ambitions for CCE for two
reasons. First, as research conducted by BOP Consulting in 2006 showed,
the Creative Partnerships programme can in some ways claim to be the
largest single investment in artists and the arts sector – in terms of
professional development – ever undertaken in the UK (BOP Consulting,
2006). Working with the cultural and creative sectors is key to CCE’s success
and ambitions and this report sheds light on some of the assumptions and
aspirations behind those ambitions. Secondly, CCE is substantively interested
in the kind of creative education that is in tune with some of the speculations
about the shift to a creative economy. Again this report shows the historical
and theoretical complexities underlying this direction. 
We hope that the report will be useful for those interested in cultural and
creative industries. It offers a serious and sophisticated review of the
concept of the cultural and creative industries and should be of use to all
those with ambitions to act in this arena. A key part of CCE’s future
development will be shaped by an engagement with the challenges
Professor O’Connor lays out here. 
David Parker, Creativity, Culture and Education
Julian Sefton-Green
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This account takes a sixty year
trip from ‘The Culture Industry’,
through the ‘cultural industries’,
ending at the ‘creative industries’.
Its main theme is the tension
between culture and economics
which lies at the heart of this
terminology. 
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This account takes a sixty year trip from ‘The Culture Industry’, through the
‘cultural industries’, ending at the ‘creative industries’. Its main theme is the
tension between culture and economics which lies at the heart of this
terminology. This is not simply a question of ‘art’ and ‘the market’; this is part of
it, but the market in ‘cultural commodities’ has a long history and ‘artists’ have
long been at home with it. In the last century the production of cultural
commodities has accelerated with the development of technologies of
reproduction – digitalisation following in the treads of Gutenberg; and this
production has become increasingly capitalised. Commodity production is not
the same as capitalism; the former has an ancient history, the latter began 500
years ago in Europe. Capitalism is animated by the principle of unlimited
accumulation at the expense of all other values. ‘Art’ or ‘culture’ has always
been one of the limits on, or protests against, this principle. But it did so whilst
at the same time being a commodity increasingly subject to the laws of capital.
Section One begins with Adorno, who thought that these laws of industrial
capitalism had finally abolished any kind of critical or authentic culture. In Section
Two we look at those writers in the 1970s who felt that the cultural appeal of
cultural commodities was central to their economic success and thus could not
be rigidly planned or predicted. People wanted to buy things that genuinely
appealed to them. This new attitude to the cultural industries produced a new
kind of cultural policy, exemplified by the Greater London Council. 
In Section Three we chart the emergence of new economic discourses which
argued for the end of mass production and a rise in cultural consumption.  This
new production foregrounded small businesses, networks, risk-taking, creativity
and constant innovation in a way that set the cultural industries as exemplars for
a new kind of economy and central to our future economic growth.
In Section Four we look at how this was reflected in new thinking about cities
and urban economies. Parallel to the rise of cultural industries was the growing
importance of culture for city image and place making, cultural tourism and
urban regeneration. They form part of the talk of creative cities and creative
class which are with us today.
In Section Five we look at the creative industries, as launched by the New
Labour government in 1998, suggesting some problems with the terminology
itself and the policy agenda to which it gave rise. At the end we put forward
some thoughts on the connections and contradictions between cultural and
economic policy. 
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Introduction
The Culture Industry found its full
purpose when it became integrated
into the new system of monopoly
capitalism, which was predicated
on total control of the masses.
Here Adorno equates the American
Culture Industry with European
Fascism (Huyssen, 1986).
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1 The culture industry as
kulturkritic
1.1 Adorno, modern culture and modernist aesthetics
Discussions of the cultural industries usually start from Theodor Adorno, who,
with his colleague Max Horkheimer, first coined the term in 1947 with the
essay ‘The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception’ (chapter 3 in
Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979). Adorno’s subsequent writings - on film, radio,
newspapers and (most notoriously) jazz and popular music – all re-affirmed
the message that under monopoly capitalism, art and culture had now
become thoroughly absorbed by the economy (Huyssen, 1986; Adorno 1991). 
However, Adorno is not to be equated with those conservative cultural critics
of ‘mass society’ who held the combination of modern communication
technologies, mass democracy and mass industrial organisation responsible
for a universal cultural collapse, with the European arts tradition as a last
refuge from general barbarism. Nor can he be associated with those who saw
modernist art as the last great incarnation of that tradition, thus to be
protected and supported against the forces of industrialised culture (cf.
Greenberg, 1961). Adorno’s post-war writings on the Culture Industry ran
parallel to the founding of the different national arts and cultural ministries and
foundations across Europe, and indeed to the emergence of a distinct
discourse of cultural policy per se. 
The new Culture Industry sought the surface effects associated with both
popular culture and ‘high art’ – means of attraction and seduction, of
stimulating desire without reflection, providing distraction at the expense of
thought. Glittering novelty masked endless repetition and endless
disappointment. As such the Culture Industry was a direct extension of the
new industries of mass reproduction and distribution which had begun at the
turn of the 19th century – film, sound recording, mass circulation dailies,
popular prints and later, radio broadcasting. But it also grew out of the art
tradition on whose surface techniques it also drew but whose intrinsic
meaning it abandoned (Adorno, 1981, 1992). It was in this context that avant-
garde modernism began its great aesthetic renunciations, its retreat into
difficult and occult formal procedures. 
The Culture Industry found its full purpose when it became integrated into the
new system of monopoly capitalism, which was predicated on total control of
the masses. Here Adorno equates the American Culture Industry with
European Fascism (Huyssen, 1986). The modern worker has been completely
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integrated into the industrial machine, a controlled automaton he now has his
leisure time and his interiority programmed and controlled by modern
industrial techniques. The Fordist factory system now moved into the realm
of culture used as a powerful ideological tool. The techniques of the Culture
Industry – the use of predictable effects, the controlled manipulation of
audience response, and the endlessly deferred gratification of stimulated
desire – which had been developed under the pressure of commodification,
were now used by monopoly capitalism itself. The Culture Industry moguls
were servants of the latter – they were answerable to oil, steel and electricity.
Like Goebbels’ subservience to Hitler, the Culture Industry was ultimately a
tool of the ruling class and the State. 
As we shall see, there are some real problems with this position, but before
this let us look at certain aspects of this argument and try to put Adorno’s
concerns into some historical perspective. 
1.2 Cultural commodities
1.2.1 Technological reproduction
The ‘industrialisation’ of culture is often associated with modern technological
reproducibility, but in fact the cultural commodity has an ancient history.
Walter Benjamin, a colleague of Adorno, talked about the ‘aura’ of the art
object (and its erosion in contemporary culture) suggesting its origins in cultic
and ritual practices (Benjamin, 1970). These unique ‘artistic’ products always
had great sacred, symbolic and/or prestige value; but they could also be given
or traded for other objects or services or money. Technological reproduction
extended this commodity market in quite ancient times. Metal casting was an
early form of mass reproduction (including minting coins), and productivity
gains through efficient division of labour could be found in classical Chinese
porcelain production. But it was with the invention of printing that
technological reproducibility became linked to profound changes in the
dynamics of cultural production and consumption.
Mass reproduction allows the initial investment in materials, skills and time to
be recouped by volume sales of the copies - the cheaper the copy the more
the potential profit. With each new technological improvement of the printing
press the time and effort involved in reproduction fell (Briggs and Burke,
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2005). Along with moveable type came improvements in wood block printing
and then etching, producing a new market in prints. With photography, copies
of artworks improved still further, and gradually images of the real world
became art objects in their own right. The early 20th century saw the capture
of moving images and the elusive world of sound on wax discs. At the end of
that century, digital technology opened up possibilities which we are still only
beginning to grasp. 
1.2.2 Commodity production
Technological reproduction is necessary but not sufficient to explain the
expansion of cultural commodity production. In Capital Marx traces the
complex historical process by which a fairly limited sphere of commodity
production (common to all but the most primitive societies) becomes the
dominant form of economic production, and by which the whole economic
and social structure becomes reconfigured around the need of capital to
produce, distribute and sell commodities at a profit (Marx, 1976). 
In Europe for example, printing arrived in parallel with an emergent market
economy controlled by an increasingly powerful urban merchant class; part of
a wider political context of a fragmented or ‘granular’ power structure where
no single State was able to completely impose its authority, either across the
region or within its own boundaries. Books had been sacred, copied by hand,
singular objects of great value. The printing press changed all this – but how
was the production and distribution of these multiple copies to be organised?
Who paid who, and for what exactly? How did Gutenberg recoup his money?
On what basis was the writer to be paid? What was ‘intellectual property’ (IP)
– a god-given right possessed by all authors or something bought for a fee by
a publisher to do with as he wished? These were difficult legal questions, at a
time when ‘property’ itself was hardly well defined. But it reflected a wider
uncertainty about what such commodities actually were. Did value reflect the
paper and the ink and the time taken to make and set the presses, or the
creative work of the author? If it was the former, then what about bad books;
if the latter, then how exactly was this to be measured? In the meantime a
cultural commodity economy began to grow by trial and error, wrapped up in
different customs, legalities and practices. Publishers, authors, and
booksellers emerged who knew how to play the system (though of course
there were many that didn’t!). 
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1.2.3 Media and communication
The emergence of an extended commodity economy involved profound
cultural transformations, as the fundamental structures of personal and
collective meaning were overturned. Crucially, the very symbolic means by
which these conflicting meanings were circulated, contested and extrapolated
within this changing society were themselves becoming commodities. Again,
this was by no means a straightforward or uncontested process – indeed, it is
the main subject of this review.
The invention of printing is not primarily seen as epoch-making because it
gave rise to the cultural commodity but because it radically transformed the
sphere of media or communications. It replaced the age-old domination of the
(mostly religious) visual image by the printed word. The circulation of the
sacred text was restricted by its limited number and the illiteracy of the
population (why learn when there was nothing to read?). The mass
reproduction of books was a direct challenge to established religious and
political authority. The vernacular Bible, followed by a whole series of scientific
and humanistic tracts, took knowledge and information outside of the carefully
regulated sphere of royal and religious authority. The mass reproduction of
books was associated with the emergence of new radical political and
religious movements, and ultimately with the emergence of the modern
democratic nation-state. 
Important for us is that though sovereign and religious authorities constantly
strove to regulate them, the new print media were organised mainly around
the market and a new range of private and civic institutions which grew up
with it – newspapers, political and religious groups (and their presses),
scientific and humanistic societies, salons and coffee houses etc. In short, the
print media became the basis of a new ‘public sphere’ between the State and
individual, and made up of a range of institutions under the control of ‘public
opinion’. It was this public sphere – classically outlined by Habermas (1989), a
pupil of Adorno – which formed the basis for the contestation and legitimation
of political and socio-economic power over the last 250 years. 
Adorno’s Culture Industry was thus not primarily about the commodification of
culture; it was about the organisation of cultural commodity production on a
mass industrial scale. As such the complex play between art as commodity
and as autonomous form collapsed as the independent artist gave way to the
culture factory.
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1.3 The autonomy of art
1.3.1 Aesthetics 
The invention of aesthetics is usually attributed to the German writer
Alexander Baumgarten, in the mid-18th century, and its more systematic
elaboration to Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Judgement (Caygil, 1990;
Bowie, 2003). In very general terms it suggests that the sensual world as
manifested in art has a distinct status from that of pure sense perception and
from pure rational understanding. In German romantic and critical philosophy,
the aesthetic came to stand for a way of knowing the world through its
sensuous particularity rather than the abstract universals of scientific-rational
knowledge. In this way it also came to be seen as a response to or rejection
of the market and the industrial-bureaucratic society that reduced everything
to interchangeable commodities and administered objects. The autonomy
claimed by ‘aesthetic art’ (Ranciere 2004; 2009) related then to both its
refusal of certain tendencies in modernity and its promise of a reconciled
future life – what Adorno called the ‘utopian promise’ of art. Following
Bourdieu (1984) this autonomy has frequently been reduced to a strategy by
which the emergent bourgeoisie attempted to represent its particular taste as
universal taste. Similarly Kant’s idea that art be ‘disinterested’ is equated with
an exclusion of those lower classes driven by need and an (over) emphasis
on the higher faculties at the expense of ‘vulgar’ bodily pleasures. In this way
‘high aesthetics’ is reduced to an ideological assault on the ‘low’ pleasures of
popular culture (Carey, 2005; McKee, 2006; – and more intelligently
Stallybrass and White, 1986; Eagleton, 1990). This reduction ignores the
crucial role of aesthetics in shaping ideas of modern subjectivity and the
relationship between individual and society, the particular and the universal
that is at the heart of debates around the cultural and creative industries. 
1.3.2 Autonomous art: production and consumption
However autonomy is interpreted, from the 18th century onwards (though
some time before that in literature) the main mediator between artist and
public became the market; and it was a market that extended beyond the
local, beyond the national, onto a European and international scale. The work
of art increasingly became a commodity that could generate unprecedented
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wealth at the top end. This is something artists both resisted and exploited;
on the one hand it reduced something with intrinsic, ‘sacred’ value to an
interchangeable exchange value; but on the other, it freed the artist from
direct dependence on a patron, giving them the social and financial space
(and incentive) to pursue their artistic development (cf. Williams, 1981). 
At the same time the moment of composition and the moment of
consumption became separated in time and space, and both acts themselves
dispersed across different social times and spaces. Thus one aspect of this
‘autonomy’ was that artists (and this category gained common currency
across the 18th century) found direct communication with an audience or a
public increasingly opaque. This was the social context in which artists
uncovered a space in which to develop the intrinsic possibilities of their
material, to an extent that marked European art off from that of other great
contemporary cultures. It introduced a concern with formal innovation into
the work of even the most ‘conservative’ of artists – Bach and Mozart or
Watteau and Gainsborough. Each looked to the development of these formal
possibilities in ways that could and did disrupt communication from time to
time. In Beethoven, Delacroix, Courbet or Flaubert this impulse became more
pronounced, reaching an explicit ideology in avant-garde modernism. Here is
the space of social critique that Adorno invoked. 
1.3.3 Art, utility and the market
The supposed 19th century opposition between pure art and the sordid world
of commerce and industry is a cliché that animates much talk about
contemporary arts and cultural industries policy. This opposition is much more
ambiguous when examined in historical detail. As cultural consumption began
to extend from relatively small circles to those new social groups involved in
the mercantilist expansion of economies and empires (Bayly, 2004), thick
layers of chintz hid the commercial basis of art markets; but its reality was a
fact of life for any aspiring artist, musician or man of letters. By the middle of
the 19th century, with industrialisation in full spate, this growing cultural
commodification, as Adorno indicates, provoked a resistance in the form of a
range of artistic and (to use an anachronistic term) ‘lifestyle’ strategies. The
former would include ‘art for art’s sake’, a radical engagement with left-wing
politics, or a more ambiguous stroll through the dark side of modernity; the
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latter might produce the aesthete, the ‘man of the people’, the bohemian or
the flâneur.  
But the art-market nexus is much more complex than the art-utility separation
allows. The account of Pierre Bourdieu (1996) portrays a complex structure of
state and party political organisations, educational institutions and academies,
private publishing houses and galleries, philanthropists, subscribers, the
press, salons, journals, bohemian cafés, theatres, and concert halls – the
whole panoply of that ‘public sphere’ across which artistic value was created
and realised. The production of cultural commodities was not simply
organised around volume sales (‘the market’) but on a complex and volatile
validation through the intricate play of fine art academies, journals and
opposing salons. Indeed, this ‘creative field’ allowed the emergence of a
‘restricted’ economy of artistic products that explicitly rejected market
success yet gained high prestige (cultural capital) – which, in turn, could
translate into economic success.
1.3.4 Cultural policy against the market
Adorno’s notion of the Culture Industry went in parallel with an emergent
post-war cultural policy discourse which attempted to intervene against the
market in order to secure culture from the miasma of commerciality. This
was not simply a case of what we now call ‘market failure’, where the State
steps in to do what the market cannot; it was a positive intervention to
reduce or regulate the role of the market in that public sphere through which
cultural valuation and validation took place. In doing so it reduced the ‘creative
field’ through which culture was produced and circulated to an opposition of
‘market’ and ‘cultural’ value - cultural policy springing to the defence of the
latter in the face of the former. The ways in which, for example, the Arts
Council of Great Britain drew lines between what should and should not be
funded based around the extent of commercialisation present is well
documented (Hewison, 1997; Lewis, 1991). This should not be interpreted
simply as the acquisition by élite taste groups of the public funding
mechanism (though it certainly was this) but also of a wider renegotiation of
the relationship between the State and culture. 
The roots of this are deep, going back to early modernity. But the ‘civilising
process’ of the 19th century is increasingly linked to the legitimation of the
Nation-State in mass democracy – the invention of tradition, the promotion of
national heritage sites, archives, museums and a musical and literary canon
(Hobsbawn and Ranger, 1983; Anderson, 1983; Bennett, 1998). But there is
also a strong social-democratic element to be found emerging in the 1920s
and 1930s (expressed in more forthright terms in the Soviet Union) and
emerging with great vigour after 1945, when the masses were to be given
access to their birthright, and the inherited culture of the nation and humanity,
which as a whole had been previously restricted by a lack of education and
leisure, as well as by the private property rights of the rich and the disgraced
(in mainland Europe at least) aristocracy. The nationalisation of culture thus
entailed an element of democratic collectivisation.  
1.4 The masses and industrial culture
As we noted above, the roots of post-war cultural policy are long, going back
to strong traditions of the transformative power of the arts, while also having
a more prosaic role in the civilisation of the masses. Accompanying the
building of galleries and museums in London, Leeds and Manchester, in
Marseilles and Lille, in Boston and St Louis and in cities across the face of
the industrialising world were grandiose claims about the historical mission of
these new urban civilisations - the New Athens, the New Florence etc. (Hunt,
2004). Along with these came the more pragmatic claim that only in this way
could the dangerous classes be brought out of ignorance and anarchy.  The
other side, of course, was a fear of the dilution of this culture as it was
spread across a semi-literate mass. This was a classic ambiguity played out
across a range of optimistic and pessimistic approaches to the forthcoming
‘rise of the masses’.
The turn of the twentieth century saw mass education, along with growing
spending power and disposable leisure time, combine with a range of
technological and business innovations to produce a new wave of cultural
production and consumption. As Adorno notes, this growing
commercialisation affected not just ‘middle brow’ or working class culture;
much of this new consumption took its model precisely from high art. Film
looked to theatre (and the piano players to the Great Masters), popular music
to opera and the symphony concert, ‘pulp’ writing to the great literary stylists,
photography to fine art and so on (Frith, 1998). But equally, ‘high art’ also was
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drawn into the new dynamics of commercial culture. For example, the
recorded music industry transformed the field of classical music (indeed
helped coin the term). It made stars out of Caruso, Chaliapin, Toscanini and
composers such as Stravinsky. It restructured orchestral playing and singing
styles; and opened up new possibilities of home and private listening
(Eisenberg, 2005). Similar arguments could be made about cinema and the
theatre (including opera and ballet). 
More conservative critics such as T.S. Eliot or D.H. Lawrence saw the
masses as impervious, even antithetical to culture – and John Carey (1992)
has traced such views. Others were more concerned about the impact of
new forms of culture on traditional left wing culture. Edmund Wilson’s
ending in 1940 of his To the Finland Station (2004) points the way, where
baseball and football take over from left wing politics, introducing the theme
of mass apolitical consumerism which was to follow in the 1950s. J.B.
Priestley (1934) writes about the cinema’s impact on the popular
imagination, eroding local cultures, and providing them with dreams with
little to do with their real lives. He sees soullessness at the Nottingham
Goose Fair, where the mechanical rides exhilarate but somehow empty the
old communal experience of the fair. The impact of ‘American’ commercial
culture on both the indigenous ‘folk traditions’ and – especially in the UK –
on older working class communities is a theme that persists into the
tradition of Richard Hoggart (1957) and others, forming the basis of an
engagement with these themes through ‘British Cultural Studies’ (Bennett,
1990; Frow, 1995; Turner, 2002). 
The rediscovery of the tradition of
modernist radicalism by the post-
1968 counter-culture brought with
it a new articulation of anti-
capitalist critique around
alienation, restriction of freedom,
and the need for authenticity – all
given powerful voice by very active
bohemian and artistic traditions
(Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005; Binkley, 2007).
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2 Cultural industries: political
economy and cultural politics
2.1 New critiques of culture
Adorno’s account of the Culture Industry resonated with post-war anxieties
about mass, industrial or ‘Americanised’ culture, and the debates around a
cultural policy concerned to protect a European cultural tradition against
these threats. Adorno’s crucial contribution of a theory of modernist
aesthetics and politics, emphasising the connection between art and society
at the level of formal logics and contradictions, made its way along very
different intellectual pathways. 
The rebellions of the ‘counter-culture’ and May ’68 involved a challenge to
established cultural hierarchies. This challenge saw a rediscovery of the
modernist and avant-garde debates of the interwar period and their concern
with politics and form. (Jameson, 1971; Adorno et al, 1977). These radical
formal questions had been outlawed by Nazi and then Soviet ‘realist’
aesthetics. But so too was post-war democratic cultural policy (where
universal access would ensure a common participation in a national, and
sometimes European, heritage) increasingly challenged by the discovery of a
strong radical intent embodied in much of that modernist/avant-garde
tradition consigned to the outer rooms of the great European cultural
narrative. More generally the Left, faced with the evident success of
capitalism, were drawn to cultural accounts of its persistence and of newer
forms of opposition to it. In this context Adorno’s Culture Industry, as
cultural collapse or as total system, was subjected to increased scrutiny. On
the one hand the Culture Industry had grown enormously in scope and
visibility since his first writing, but on the other, it was clear that his account
of it was simply not adequate.
In the UK we can find two distinct bodies of work in which Adorno’s account
was interrogated: British Cultural Studies and the political economy school1. 
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1 For reasons of space I omit the US based ‘Production of Culture’ school. cf. Peterson, 1976, 1982, 1990; DiMaggio,
1977; DiMaggio and Useem, 1978; Becker, 1984; also discussions in Wolff (1981) and Hesmondhalgh (2007)
2.2 British cultural studies
There is extensive literature on this, but we can identify three aspects or
phases which are useful for our theme. First were those community studies
of working class life and traditions which attempted to assert their cultural
validity in the face of the more dominant, ‘official’ culture (e.g. Hoggart,
1957). This went hand in hand with Raymond Williams’ work on this official
culture, trying to both historicise the notion of art and culture, and to give it a
more sociological (and ‘progressive’) grounding than those official (and
conservative) accounts of culture established by writers such as T.S. Eliot
and F.R. Leavis before the Second World War (Williams, 1958; 1961). 
Williams was never naive about the institutional entrenchment of dominant
values and the relationship of symbolic products to these. The newer groups
organised in the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies took
this further using theory brought in from Italy (Gramsci especially) and
France (most notably Althusser). Taking up the challenge of Williams’
‘culture is ordinary’, they rejected older ideas of commercial ‘mass culture’
being a threat to a working class ‘way of life’ and saw, in subcultures
especially, new forms of popular culture – around music, leisure spaces,
clothes, consumer objects – not as passive consumption but as active forms
of symbolic resistance to the dominant social order (cf. Hall and Jefferson,
1976; Gilroy, 1992).
A third phase, from the late 1970s onwards, extended this examination of
symbolic domination and resistance, as Thatcher’s new conservative agenda
began to roll over the political, social and cultural landscape of Britain. This
criticism became more pronounced as new (post)structuralist tools were
brought in to help with the task of reading/de-coding popular symbolic
products. On the one hand critics saw an abandonment of real economic
analysis in favour of textual analysis (Garnham, 1990); on the other – and
more worryingly - they felt that this emphasis brought a much more
ambiguous cultural politics (McGuigan, 1992). 
2.3 The political economy of culture 
The’ political economy of culture’ school was fiercely opposed to the
emphasis on the ideological effects of cultural objects conceived exclusively
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as ‘texts’ rather than as commodities. In Britain the key work was done by
Nicholas Garnham, who had worked with Graham Murdock, James Curran
and others to develop a critical approach to political communication and
broadcasting policy (Garnham, 1990; Curran and Seaton, 1991; Murdoch and
Golding, 1973). In part sparked by their work, from the late 1970s, Williams
also made a significant contribution, attempting to link the political economy
writing with insights from cultural studies (1981). 
The ‘political economy school’ grew out of a more scholarly engagement
with Marx’s work, begun in the 1960s and 1970s, and in particular those
questions of base and superstructure, economy and culture, capital and
state which seemed to have re-emerged with new force. Previous
assertions of a ‘materialist’ basis for art and culture – that they reflected
interests or stages of evolution elsewhere in the economic base – were
seen as far too simplistic. Garnham (1990) along with Williams (1981) argued
that this ‘materialism’ tended to be both too much and not enough. Too
materialist in the sense that culture was seen to be completely reducible to
the needs of ‘capital’ or the ‘ruling class’; not materialist enough in the
sense that, once stated, there was no examination of how this culture got
produced, by whom and under what conditions. The central contention of
the political economy school was that under capitalism culture was
increasingly produced as a commodity, and thus subject to the logic and the
contradictions of this system of production. 
This approach thus identified 4 areas where Adorno’s thesis seemed lacking.
2.3.1 Cultural use value
Against Adorno’s total system of pre-programmed cultural commodities,
they argued that ‘use value’ had to satisfy some fundamental human need
for meaning or enjoyment. There was a clear need for new and different
products, to see these products as the work of a creative individual or team,
and to feel a certain authenticity of meaning and enjoyment. There is thus an
underlying tension between exchange and use value at the heart of the
cultural commodity. Cultural commodities are expensive to produce but
cheap to reproduce – the more copies sold the greater the return on the
original investment. But there are limits on this reproduction; people are not
content to consume the same, they want new and different products. For
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this reason cultural commodities are prone to a short shelf life, and income
has to be maximised before it hits the sell-by date.  
2.3.2 Prediction and pre-programming
The second charge was that the prediction and ‘pre-programming’ of
audience response was simply not possible. Indeed, as many writers
stressed, it was often hard to know if a product would sell at all! Peterson’s
(1990) account of the emergence of rock‘n’roll could stand as a classic
example here, but a whole list of examples from books, films, music and
broadcasting illustrated the volatility and unpredictability of demand for
cultural products. Taken together, the need for new and appealing product
coupled with the unpredictability of demand meant that the Culture Industry
was faced with a difficult business model – though whether this is a difficult
business problematic (Caves, 2000) or a fundamental contradiction (Ryan,
1992) is a matter of debate.
2.3.3 Multiple culture industries 
The third charge against Adorno was that his totalising concept of the Culture
Industry failed to register the distinctions between the different kinds of
cultural commodities that were derived from the mechanism whereby
exchange value was collected. Miege (1979; 1987; 1989) was most
systematic in his taxonomies. In general there were three different models of
realising exchange value. First, physical objects carrying cultural content were
sold as commodities to individuals – books, records, videos etc. Second,
television and radio broadcasting were (apart from what was then a limited
subscription audience) available free to consumers and made money out of
advertising and sponsorship. Here there were strong interventions by the
State, often taking broadcasting completely out of private ownership and
providing it as a public service financed by taxation. In most States some mix
of public service and commercial stations was in place. Newspapers and
magazines occupied an intermediary position, where individual copies were
paid for but advertising brought in the bulk of the revenue. Thirdly, those
forms associated with public performance – music, theatre, and especially
cinema - depended on restricted viewing and charging an admission fee. As
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such, the concept of the Culture Industry gave way to that of the cultural
industries, each sub-sector with different ways of realising exchange value,
different ways of managing demand and creative labour, and different levels
of capital investment and corporate control.
2.3.4 The independent artist
The fourth area of critique was the status of creative labour in the cultural
industries. Given the centrality of the radically free creative genius to the
western art tradition since the 18th century, the absorption of the artist into
the Culture Industry was, as we have seen, a key index of cultural
catastrophe. Though Adorno predicted this total absorption, he recognised
that many areas of the Culture Industry still operated on an artisan basis,
with the creators remaining ‘free’ - if only to starve. The political economy
school argued that this ‘artisan’ basis not only persisted but did not look like
disappearing. 
Williams (1981) attempted to give an historical account of the status of the
cultural producer as they moved out of patronage into production for the
market. We move from direct artisanal production for the market to a post-
artisanal phase in which at first, cultural products are distributed by a market
intermediary. Gradually this market intermediary becomes more productive,
investing in the purchase of work for the purpose of profit – and thus it is
the intermediary rather than the artists who has direct relations with the
market. In the 19th century a more complex process sees the artist working
as market professional, becoming much more directly involved in the
marketing process, and through copyright and royalties he has a direct share
in the profits. The next stage is the corporate professional, where large
cultural producers directly employ full-time salaried workers. Williams sees
this at its most extensive in the ‘new media’ sector – cinema, radio, and
television – where high levels of capitalisation and technology are involved.
Though this seemed likely to Williams in the early 1980s this turned out not
to be the whole case; as we shall see, ‘creative labour’ remained very much
about freelancers, short term contracts and flexible working (see also
Oakley, 2009a).
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2.4 From culture industry to cultural industries policy
Hesmondhalgh (2007) underlines the importance of the change in
terminology from ‘Culture Industry’ to ‘cultural industries’. It involved a
conceptual shift that by the early 1980s had given rise to a more empirically
based understanding of the complex structure and variable dynamics at
work in the production of culture. It allowed an understanding of the
connections between technologies of production and distribution, changing
business models, the emergent connections between symbolic and
informational goods, and between culture and communications systems. It
made more clear the connections and contradictions between the
production and circulation of culture and the wider ideological needs of the
State; and it focused attention on the ambiguous status of creative labour
within the whole system. But it was not just a research agenda or critique -
it opened up Adorno’s total system to the possibility of a new kind of cultural
politics.
Given the above, it was clear that the cultural industries could no longer be
characterised simply as the ‘other’ to authentic art; and both would benefit
from a more neutral sociological approach as the production and circulation
of symbolic forms or texts. It also suggested that the cultural industries
themselves could be brought within the orbit of cultural policy – but how? 
In France for example, renewed US pressure for a de-regulation of (and
access to new markets for) cultural trade in the late 1970s around the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) talks, had met with a new
sense that the cultural industries needed to be protected as part of a
national cultural policy. Building on the work of Miege and others, some in
the French Ministry of Culture argued that as the vast majority of cultural
products consumed were produced by the commercial sector these could
not be simply left to fend for themselves whilst the (minority) arts absorbed
all the attention (Girard, 1982). 
The experiments in France and elsewhere were part of a wider re-think of
cultural policy – away from the unitary notion of the Nation-State and its
heritage to something more diverse and complex. But it was also about a
more active and democratic involvement in cultural policy-making and
cultural production (Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993). Williams (1981) had
noted that technology was becoming cheaper and more generally available.
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Electronic sound production and mixing, cassette recorders, video recorders
and cameras, photocopying, printing, photography – these were
transforming the production and circulation of text, image and sound, with a
massive proliferation of both commodified and non-commodified activity.
These came with a revival of those debates from the 1920s about the
transformative power of technology in the hands of the masses (Benjamin,
1970). This level of activity was increasingly counter-posed to the dead hand
of corporate control. It was a sensibility that had exploded in Punk and Post-
Punk, and the history of the Greater London Council’s (GLC) cultural
industries strategy is unthinkable without it (Savage, 1992; Reynolds, 2005;
Haslam, 2005). 
The GLC’s work between 1979 and 1986 has rightly been credited with the
first cultural industries strategy at a local level but it is more than this – it
was a series of sketches for a contemporary democratic cultural policy.
Bianchini (1987) identified the influence of Italian cultural policies – the
revived Communist Parties trying to engage the younger, more urban and
more radicalised cultures which had emerged out of the contestations of the
1970s.  Garnham’s 1983 paper for the GLC is often taken as an account of
their activity (Garnham 1990).
The crucial point made by Garnham is that art and the market are not
inimical to each other – the market is a relatively efficient way of allocating
resources and reflecting choice. Public policy can and should use the market
as a way to distribute cultural goods and services – and to do so in a way
that follows audience demand rather than the ambitions of the producers
themselves. Garnham’s focus was not on local economic production
strategy but on developing a democratic cultural policy based on an
educated and informed audience demand to which publicly-owned
distribution companies and cultural producers alike could respond. It was
explicitly not about that support for local cultural producers with which the
GLC is most identified and which he associates with encouraging a supply
for which there is no audience. 
There are three key points here.
First, his emphasis on audience research, efficient marketing and responding
to demand, whilst making an important point about the responsibilities of
publicly funded culture, failed to take any account of the processes of
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innovation, of reinvention, of counter factual imagination that come precisely
from the disjunction between what the artist wants to produce and what the
public wants to receive, or between the aspirations to the new and the facts
of revealed preference. 
Second, Garnham said that access to cultural production is necessarily
restricted if a ‘reserve army of the unemployed’ is to be avoided. It’s not
clear just how this restriction might be effected given the growing
aspirations to active cultural production which the GLC vision reflected; nor,
despite the training for under-represented minorities, how long-standing
cultural and economic exclusions from cultural production might be
addressed. 
Third, Garnham’s was a very partial account of the GLC’s cultural industries
strategy –hardly given the time to develop in reality. The impact on
subsequent local economic and cultural strategies was however very high. It
represented an attempt to break out of a cultural policy centred on the ‘arts’
– and on subsidies to artists and producing institutions as the foundation of
that policy. The strategies began to address the conditions of the
commercial production of culture using economic and statistical tools (e.g.
value-chains, employment mapping), focusing on how the sector as a whole
worked – including those crucial ancillary and non-creative activities. As such
it represented an industrial approach to cultural policy, using economic
means to achieve cultural (and economic) objectives.
2.5 Cultural policy: politics and aesthetics 
The increasing insertion of cultural industries into a new kind of democratic
cultural policy raises some fundamental issues around economics and
culture, but also culture and politics. The political economy school tended to
look more to the political and ideological implications of ownership and
control, of concentration and monopoly, of the fraught lines between public
and private, especially in the dominant broadcast media sphere. This thrust
became increasingly pronounced as de-regulation strategies grew apace in
the 1980s and 90s (Hesmondhalgh, 2007). 
Adorno’s modernist aesthetics saw the space of social critique residing very
much in the formal qualities of the work of art; but such ‘formalism’ was still
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rather avant-garde in the 1970s. The traditional left saw the critical function
of art residing in its techniques of representation, of it generating a realist
account of the world (Jameson, 1977). Though never stated directly, there is
a sense in the political economy school that this representational function is
politically the most central and within this the word (written and spoken) is
paramount (Garnham, 2000). Cultural Studies, on the other hand, looked to
different qualities residing in the specific formal and semiotic structures of
the text.
This is not just a difference over modernist formalism, but over a wider
sense of the role of ‘art’ in contemporary society. What was that space of
autonomy whose loss Adorno saw as a catastrophe? Williams, for example,
was clear that art was not a ‘sacred’ transhistorical category, but it did
represent a fundamental human need (Williams, 1981). In its search for an
intrinsic value as ‘art’ it represented a site of contestation with capitalism –
not simply as a site of ideological and political struggle of representation but
as a symbolic assertion of an ‘authentic’ meaning that should be, though for
Williams was not, part of everyday, ordinary culture. We saw that this
formed a crucial part of the notion of aesthetic theory; that art should be
separate from the everyday (and thus critical of it) yet always carry the
promise that it might one day be an authentic part of it. For others in cultural
studies the aesthetic tradition, as a form of bourgeois ideology, is simply an
illusion to be overcome, a trap to be avoided (Wolff, 1983; Bennett, 1990;
Frow, 1995).
On the other hand, this ‘artistic’ or ‘cultural opposition’ to capitalism, the
promise to ‘change life’, as Rimbaud said, had very real social and political
consequences, not least from the 1960s onwards. The rediscovery of the
tradition of modernist radicalism by the post-1968 counter-culture brought
with it a new articulation of anti-capitalist critique around alienation,
restriction of freedom, and the need for authenticity – all given powerful
voice by very active bohemian and artistic traditions (Boltanski and Chiapello,
2005; Binkley, 2007). In many respects indeed, this aesthetic promise was
seen to reside also in forms of popular culture (Frith, 1998). However much
these impulses have subsequently been held to lead to new forms of post-
material consumption (see below), they cannot be easily dismissed as
merely post-Kantian illusions (Ranciere, 2004; 2009).
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‘Culture’, previously seen as a
marginal and mainly decorative or
prestige expenditure, began to
move much closer to the centre of
policy-making as a potential
economic resource. 
3 From cultural to creative
industries
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The abolition of the GLC in 1986 took place against the backdrop of the
removal by the Conservative Government of a number of internal political
oppositions, not least the National Union of Mineworkers whose strike
collapsed in March 1985. The cultural industries policy agenda did not
disappear, but moved beyond London to a number of the other metropolitan
authorities and residual bodies which had been abolished in the same
process. These bodies lacked the profile, ambition and resources (political,
financial and intellectual) of the GLC initiative, which contributed in part to
the increased emphasis on the specific economic dimensions of the cultural
industries agenda. 
3.1 From cultural to local economic policy
In many ways this shift had a pragmatic basis and its elaboration into a
workable body of policy knowledge happened outside academia, outside
national government circles, and usually on the periphery of local
government where economic development agencies, struggling to come to
terms with an expanded agenda and reduced resources, intersected with
the arts funding agencies. Thatcher’s struggle against the (mainly Labour)
local authorities in the 1980s saw a massive restriction in their powers of
planning and local taxation. At the same time they were being asked to
deliver an economic development agenda based on the belief that
manufacturing was finished and that the only room for manoeuvre was to
provide a business-friendly environment and relevant local skills. Economic
development departments were fairly new to British local government, and
they struggled to develop an agenda that would work with national
government imperatives and a more local Labour Party political base. After
the national elections of 1987 the large metropolitan areas transformed their
vision for the future around making this agenda work for their cities. But
local economic development became, not just a necessity, but also a site in
which a new urban vision was forged; for some this was a betrayal of an
older politics, for others it was an attempt to seize the initiative in a changing
world (Hall and Jacques, 1989; Hirst, 1989; Thompson, 2002; Finlayson,
2003). In the process ‘culture’, previously seen as a marginal and mainly
decorative or prestige expenditure, began to move much closer to the
centre of policy-making as a potential economic resource. 
The arts sector began to develop arguments about managerial efficiency and
economic benefits in terms of employment, tourism and image
enhancement. John Myerscough (1988) developed a model for measuring
the impact of spending on the arts; not just direct spending on employment
(how many jobs per pound ‘invested’, as the new terminology had it) but
attendance at arts events generated spending in cafés, restaurants and
other local amenities. Myerscough was able to use a ‘multiplier effect’
which gave a figure for the additional employment and local spend
generated by public investment in the arts. 
Myerscough’s work foregrounded the local economic impact of the arts.
Local authorities in fact spent significant amounts of money on the arts, and
they too were keen to assert the economic benefits of this spend. But,
given the difficult economic circumstances facing the old industrial towns
and cities, this spend was now linked with an agenda of developing new
visitor attractions. Visitors would spend locally and these new facilities
would also have an image enhancement effect: they would announce a new
forward-looking image of the city to the wider world. In addition, the
development of new cultural facilities was – following an emergent US
model – increasingly linked to other leisure, retail and office developments.
After museums came the cultural quarters and with that, a discourse of
culture-led urban renaissance which is still with us (Bianchini and Parkinson,
1993; Landry, 2000; Bell and Jayne, 2004; Evans and Foord, 2005;
Roodhouse, 2006; Montgomery, 2007).
These kinds of arguments were in the main developed between the local
arts funding agencies and local economic development agencies through the
intermediation of cultural consultants. In this period ‘arts and cultural
policies’ became much more about the management of the cultural sector
as a complex whole, and its integration with the general strategic vision of
the City; it demanded new analytical tools and knowledge from outside
traditional arts policy making. A new kind of professional was needed to
elaborate this knowledge within local policy fields. This was not available
within academia; it was elaborated at the level of a small community of
cultural consultants, the most well-known of which, Comedia, came directly
out of the GLC experience. It was from within this emergent field also that
New Labour’s creative industries policies began to take shape. Often
portrayed as purely opportunist, or indeed philistine (‘the value of nothing’
etc.) this generation of cultural policy vision in fact responded to some far-
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reaching transformations in the economic and cultural landscape, which we
need to understand. 
3.2 From market to markets
The GLC’s ‘alternative economic strategy’ resonated with a wider European
left-wing concern to assert a distinctly new agenda in the face of both the
failures of Soviet-style top down planning, and the neo-liberal vision of the
deregulation of capital and labour markets at national and international levels.
New left thinking was focused on public economic and urban interventions
which reflected the general distrust of large scale top-down planning and
new kinds of personal and political aspirations. This had emerged quite early
at the level of local city planning (Jacobs, 1961).
In this process the market itself was subjected to re-evaluation. The
analytical tools used to understand value chains in the cultural industries and
where intervention might be most effective had involved a new engagement
with the market mechanism. This was less driven by Garnham’s overall
analysis than by other activists from within community arts and politics.
Charles Landry, a founder of Comedia, led a team of distinguished writers in
What a Way to Run a Railroad (Landry et al, 1985). This was a harsh critique
of the way in which ‘alternative’ community businesses were run. What was
often dressed up as romantic bohemian idealism was in fact incompetence.
There was no reason, they argued, that arts and community businesses
should not be run professionally and with an understanding of the market.
But what kind of market?
3.3 Fordism, post-fordism and the ‘spatial turn’
In the later 1980s political economists and economic geographers began to
talk of a shift from mass production to ‘flexible specialisation’ and ‘Post-
fordism’ (Lash and Urry, 1987; 1994; Scott, 1988; Harvey, 1989; Lipietz,
1992; Amin, 1994). This was an argument about the increasing
fragmentation and volatility of consumer markets. Predictable patterns of
mass consumption had given way to smaller niche markets and the
proliferation of goods and services which had a higher ‘symbolic’ content
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and could appeal to new ways of constructing social identity away from the
‘mainstream’. Responses to these new consumer markets demanded faster
and more detailed flows of information back to the producer and an ability to
respond to quickly changing demand through a more flexible production
process. 
A crucial outcome of this in the developed Western countries was the
growth of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). This was
accompanied by a focus on regions with strong SME networks. Like
markets, these networks were place-specific and grew out of established
social and cultural traditions (Granovetter, 1973; 1983; 1985; Markusen,
1996). In opposition to the abstracting categories of modernist economic
geography, the late 1980s saw an increased emphasis on social space as a
crucial factor in economic understanding - an emphasis which ran in close
parallel to the ‘cultural turn’ in this and indeed many other social scientific
disciplines (Soja, 1989; Crang, 1997). In terms of an emerging cultural
industries policy field we can see three consequences of this approach. 
First, the ‘spatial turn’ moved away from the unified national economic
space of modernity towards more fluid and multi-layered spatial levels. This
in itself reflected the increased awareness of a new dynamic, and the
intensity of global (and this itself was a new kind of scale) mobility – of
capital, people, knowledge and things. Manuel Castells’ hugely influential
book The Rise of the Network Society (1996) pointed to a new global scale
of exchanges built around interlocking networks. 
Second, the emphasis on spatial proximity and local SME networks
suggested that not all economic transactions are based on immediate,
‘rational’ calculations of profit and loss. ‘Clustering’ produced a range of
economic benefits – pools of common knowledge and skills, flexible human
resources, relations of trust and a sense of common goals - which were a
shared effect of these networks themselves and acted as ‘untraded
externalities’ (Porter, 1998a; 1998b; Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Gordon and
McCann, 2000; Martin and Sunley, 2003; Wolff and Gertler, 2004).
Third, these ‘untraded externalities’, bonds of trust and common goals, were
complemented by shared local knowledge which was rooted in local social
structures, institutions and cultures. Local companies participated in the
production and exploitation of this knowledge, which was mostly tacit – it
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gave competitive advantage because it could not be easily transferred or
replicated outside of these local conditions (Maskell and Malmberg, 1999;
Maskell, 2001; Simmie, 2003; 2004; Bathelt, Malmberg and Maskell, 2004;
Gertler, 2003).
3.4 The rise of small and medium sized enterprises 
This new attitude to markets, a more fluid economic and social space along
with recognition of locally embedded clusters and SME networks, and of the
specific social, political and cultural context in which they operated, had very
obvious implications for the cultural industries. One element that the
‘cultural industries’ perspective shared with that of Adorno was the focus on
the large corporations involved in cultural production and distribution, who, if
not coterminous with the whole of cultural production, certainly seemed to
occupy its commanding heights. Whilst freelancers and independent
businesses persisted even at the heart of the corporate sector, they were an
artisanal survival related to older, less capitalised cultural forms; or linked to
State subsidy; or kept on as a form of (self-) exploitation through flexible
contracts, a reserve army of labour keeping wages low and payment
through royalties rather than for actual work done. However, it was
becoming clear that freelancers and small, often micro-businesses were an
extremely significant part of overall employment in the sector – and were
growing fast (O’Brien and Feist, 1995; 1997; Pratt, 1997; Creigh-Tyte and
Thomas, 2001).
The schematic outline of the local value chain – pioneered for the cultural
industries by the GLC and extended throughout the UK by Comedia and
other consultancies (now joined by a few academics) – formed the basis of
increasingly detailed mapping. Such mapping exercises suggested four
things. First, that the different sub-sectors (music, performance, visual art,
TV etc.) were highly networked at the local level and that they operated
somehow as ‘clusters’. Second, these clusters were generally centred on
the larger metropolitan areas, acting as the locus for urban networks and as
service hubs for more dispersed sectors (such as crafts or manufacture),
suggesting that the City or urbanity itself offered something crucial to the
cultural industries sector. Third, that the line between commercial and
subsidised sectors, between primarily economic and primarily cultural
activities, or indeed between motives of ‘art’ and motives of profit was by
no means clear-cut at this local level (Jeffcut, 2004; Pratt, 2004a). 
Finally, one of the key consequences of this growth in mapping work was
the creation of the cultural industries as an object of policy. In the 1970s the
cultural industries had been taken into cultural policy at national level (or by
agencies such as UNESCO which aimed to defend threatened national
cultures). From the GLC period on, it became an essential component of all
local cultural strategies, codified as such in the UK after the creation of the
Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) in 1997. As a
consequence, one key objective of cultural industries policies in the late
1990s was to get the sector to recognise itself precisely as a sector
(O’Connor and Gu, 2010). 
3.5 Culture and economics
The emergence of the cultural industries as a viable policy object needs to
be understood against a larger backdrop of a new narrative of the breaking
down of boundaries between economics and culture. For many, especially in
the arts sector, this was a benign narrative of a misplaced alliance, one in
which both sides could now recognise the values they had so long missed
in the other. Organisations such as Arts and Business, established to try and
maximise business investment in the arts sector at a time of savage public
funding cuts, were not alone in making the case that these two could be
natural allies not sworn enemies. 
In a crucial intervention, the Marxist geographer David Harvey (1989)
surveyed the whole postmodern scene in the late 1980s and linked this with
the discussions about post-fordism, flexible specialisation, globalisation and
the collapse of the post-war socio-political settlement. A new economic and
social order was emerging, organised around consumer markets for
symbolic goods in turn related to new forms of social distinction and identity.
This was capital’s ‘cultural fix’. Harvey saw this ‘cultural fix’ working
particularly at the level of the City, where spectacles, festivals, shopping
experiences and ethnic quarters had transformed the derelict industrial cities
of the developed world into centres of up-market cultural consumption.
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Lash and Urry (1994) stressed more the role of symbolic consumption and
‘aesthetic reflexivity’ as central to the process of identity construction. There
was great (self) awareness and investment in such symbolic consumption
and this had a profound effect on the organisation of production and
circulation. To Castells’ flows of people, money, goods and information was
added a vast range of symbolic objects – texts, images, sounds, and
experiences. More crucially, it changed the position of the cultural industries
vis-à-vis the rest of the economy. We saw above that the specific nature of
the cultural commodity presented a number of problems for the realisation
of profit; whether fundamental contradiction between use and exchange
value, or a difficult business model. But the growth of symbolic consumption
meant that the tensions and difficulties of producing for such a market had
become central to many different businesses. As a result, the cultural
industries were no longer seen as a strange remnant of an older production
system, but became the cutting edge, a template for the others to follow
into a new economy of ‘signs and space’. (Lash and Urry, 1994).
3.6 New work cultures
For Lash and Urry (1987; 1994) the vertical disintegration of the big
corporate structures to be found in the mainstream economy was
accelerated within the cultural industries. It was not simply that sectors such
as television, music, design, film etc. were increasingly organised around
clusters of SMEs and freelancers but that notions of aesthetic reflexivity
and, in this sense, a more intuitive engagement with the eddies and tugs of
cultural currents, came into play as a central part of business operations.
Cultural workers were no longer to be characterised as creatives crushed by
the wheels of a corporate sector whose values they resisted as best they
could; it was precisely these people who were in possession of the means
to operate most effectively. Here various factors tended to intersect. 
First, was the idea of creativity as a crucial resource for contemporary
economic development and personal growth – indeed these two were
linked in new ways. The literature on creativity is large, so I will point to
what I consider to be its salient points only here (Negus and Pickering, 2004;
Banaji et al, 2007). First, it relates to innovation, increasingly seen as the key
to economic competitiveness. It tries to isolate the specific qualities that
give rise to new thinking, new ideas upon which innovation can build. Much
writing therefore looks to right/left brain models, feminine/masculine modes
of thought and other such ‘hard-wired’ neurological structures to be
accessed; others focus on types of education or cultural values that may
enhance or restrict these kinds of thinking. Though these often refer to the
importance of social environment, they tend to ignore the socio-historical
context in which notions like ‘creativity’ come to the fore. ‘Inventiveness’
had of course been a quality long established as vital for economic growth;
but then ‘creativity’ as an essential attribute of the human came into focus
at the very beginnings of modernity through the renaissance ‘divine spark’.
Man became the measure, and soon the active producer, of all things. As
we shall see, ‘creativity’ in the more recent sense draws on a specific
‘artistic’ quality, something deemed to be intuitive rather than calculative.
Indeed, at a time when many in cultural studies were rejecting the
‘aesthetic’, its specific ways of understanding or representing the world
were being mobilised as a new source of economic competitiveness.
However, this ‘creativity’ tends to draw on a specifically modernist aesthetic
– the shock of the new, the disruptive, the counter-intuitive, the rebellious
and the risk-taker. These are qualities to be found only sparingly in most
traditional notions of art: skill, craftsmanship, balance, harmony, the golden
mean, the middle way – all qualities which tend to be excluded from this
new use of creativity (O’Connor, 2006). 
This borrowing from an artistic discourse can be traced back through the
changing management literature of the 1970s and 1980s (Kelly, 1998; Du
Gay, 1996; 1997; Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005; Bilton, 2007). As we
suggested above, it linked to wider changes in the construction of social
values since the 1960s – echoing the shift traced by Beck (1992), from a
sense of social duty and finding one’s place to one of uncovering the self,
and of expressing the self. ‘Getting loose’ (Binkley, 2007) was also a process
of self-discovery and it drew on the values of the bohemian and artistic
traditions associated with modernism since the 19th century (Martin, 1981;
Wilson, 2000; Lloyd, 2006). By the 1990s ‘creativity’ had emerged as a
prime contemporary value, and a resource to be mobilised by business
(Leadbeater, 1999; Rifkin, 2000; Howkins, 2001; Tepper, 2002).
The second intersection was with the notion of the enterprising self (Heelas
and Morris, 1992; Heelas, 2002). This of course was a key image promoted
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by Thatcher’s attempt to re-introduce ‘Victorian values’ - with the ‘self-made
man’, small businesses and the spirit of enterprise as its backbone. But as
with many initiatives by Thatcher it was taken up by those who did not
necessarily share her values. The ‘enterprising self’ chimed not just with
small corner shops in Grantham but – as we have seen with respect to the
re-evaluation of the market – with many who had been marked by the
counter-culture’s rejection of the ‘organisation man’ and the public and
private bureaucracies of the post-war period. Against this they asserted a do-
it-yourself, work-for-yourself attitude that represented a powerful feeling of
liberation (O’Connor and Wynne, 1996; McRobbie, 1999; Boltanski and
Chiapello, 2005). This notion of autonomous, meaningful work represented
by freelancers and micro-businesses was to become a very powerful current
in New Labour’s version of ‘creative industries’.
The third intersection was with those accounts of the ‘culturalisation of the
economy’, which stressed the centrality of culture in organisational change
(Du Gay and Pryke, 2002). Responding to the challenges of the new
economy meant not just abandoning the organisational structures of Fordism;
it required a new organisational culture. Indeed, it was felt that without a
culture change involving all the workers, a company could not flexibly
compete and respond to economic changes. The cultural industries
represented a classic case, where employees were expected to participate in
the ethos of the company and its goals, giving rise to the new management
style identified by Andrew Ross (2003) in No Collar. All these suggested that
culture and creativity were to be central to a new post-fordist economy.
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Cities were now the new
economic powerhouses, built on
the ability to process knowledge
and manipulate symbols.
4.1 The rediscovery of the city
We saw above how academic writing around regional clusters and embedded
networks had been taken up in the emergent policy discourse around cultural
industries and local economic development, suggesting close connections
between the clustering of cultural industries and urbanity itself. 
These connections were an intrinsic part of that ‘rediscovery’ of the City which
took place in the 1980s and 1990s. The ‘network society’ was predicated on
the growth of key nodal points which controlled and directed global flows
(Castells 1996). Cities were now the new economic powerhouses, built on the
ability to process knowledge and manipulate symbols. A literature on global or
world cities followed, marking the re-emergence of the usual suspects – New
York, London, Paris, Los Angeles, Hong Kong – plus a few new ones and
leaving space for a range of second and third tier cities plugged into the new
global infrastructure of flows (Sassen,1991; Philo and Kearnes, 1993). 
These different currents flowed together to generate a current of reform and
transformation of city life. This certainly applies to those developing a cultural
industries policy discourse; most cultural consultants were deeply concerned
with ‘the art of city making’ (Mulgan and Walpole, 1986; Landry, 2000; 2006)
and involved in projects around cultural venues and quarters, street markets,
alternative retail, new forms of public art and signage, urban landscaping,
architectural and larger scale regeneration projects, and campaigns such as the
‘24 hour city’. This represented a coalition for urban transformation that drew
on a European tradition rather than the real-estate driven model coming from
the US (Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993). It stressed public space – in its widest
sense – and how urban design as democratic planning and contemporary
aesthetics might provide the basis for a new popular urban vision. It looked to
Barcelona rather than Boston, Montpellier rather than Philadelphia. From our
point of view however it needs to be emphasised that the cultural industries
themselves were also part of this (very loose) urban coalition and their links to
the City are not just economic but cultural – and to an extent not frequently
recognised - ethical and political (Drake, 2003; Shorthose, 2004; O’Connor,
2004; Banks, 2007; O’Connor and Gu, 2010). 
The connections between small-scale cultural producers and the City were
first made in two books trying to make sense of the urban scene of the
1970s. Raban’s Soft City (1974), identified a new metropolitan middle class
who had broken with the consumption patterns of established class cultures
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4 Creative cities
and introduced a dizzying array of styles and symbolic identifiers which
suggested to the author the mystifying complexities of Mayhew’s London2.
But, unlike Mayhew’s account of the lower depths of the 19th century poor,
these puzzling new patterns were to be found in the realm of consumption
rather than production. 
The other book, Sharon Zukin’s Loft Living, published in 1982 but very much
concerned with events in the 1970s, took this production of urban life into a
new kind of urban dynamic in which culture generated economic values
recouped, in the main, by the real estate, retail and leisure industries. The
story of how artists in SoHo won their battle against the developers – who
wanted to knock down this old industrial area and destroy the lofts which had
become home to many of New York’s leading artists – only then to lose it
again as rental and property values went sky high, is well known. Zukin used
Bourdieu’s (1986) notion of cultural and economic capital to great effect as she
showed how artists had transformed the image, the atmosphere of SoHo to
create a trendy, bohemian urban village feel which was becoming very
popular. This model was subsequently generalised (Zukin 1991; 1995).
This scenario of cultural gentrification is now fairly common, although more
often intoned than actually examined. However we want to interpret these
claims, two things at least are clear. First, that ‘culture’ has a direct impact on
the value of urban real estate, becoming a key element of culture-led urban
regeneration strategies. This impact can come from the large flagship
developments – an art gallery, concert hall or museum – and from micro-
activities associated with small scale cultural entrepreneurs and urban activists
(Solnit, 2000; Lange, 2005; Pratt, 2009). Second, that the urbanity of city life is
a crucial resource for all kinds of cultural activities which move between the
commercial and the non-commercial, the subsidised and the entrepreneurial
with great fluidity.
4.2 A new urbanity?
The proliferation of freelancers and micro-businesses in the cultural industries
across the 1980s and 1990s cannot be understood without some reference to
these wider socio-cultural aspects. The ideas of breaking the 9-5, doing it for
oneself, charting your own life course, of looking to express yourself, cannot
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2 London Labour and the London Poor (1851) is a work of Victorian journalism by Henry Mayhew. In the 1840s and
1850s he observed, documented and described the state of working people in London for a series of articles in a
newspaper, the Morning Chronicle, that were later compiled into book form
be put down simply to the ‘enterprise culture’ per se. Part of it was a taking
back of control of cultural production in the face of corporate control. What
Williams had identified at the end of Culture (1981)- where technologies of
reproduction seemed ever more accessible to the everyday person -
happened at the same time as the ‘punk ethos’ precisely stressed the ‘do it
yourself’ impulse (Savage, 1992; O’Connor and Wynne, 1996; Reynolds,
2005). Its later manifestation in ‘rave culture’ also used technologies in this
way (Redhead, 1990; Collin, 1997; Reynolds, 1998). In different ways they
were about contesting established culture and making the technologies of
reproduction work for you.  The take-up of Thatcher’s ‘enterprise allowance
scheme’ was famously highest amongst cultural businesses; and ‘Thatcher’s
children’ were those forced to become entrepreneurs because there were no
other options. Or rather, there were other options and they chose a cultural
one (McRobbie, 1999; 2002; Haslam, 2005). This attempt to take some control
over cultural production was also linked to the wider transformation of the city;
cultural entrepreneurs often linked their cultural and business aspirations to
‘urban regeneration’, with strong social and local-political overtones (Haslam,
2005; O’Connor and Gu, 2010).
The specific role of the urban milieu in the activities of the cultural industries
became an increasing concern of researchers, consultants and policy-makers
in the later 1990s. One seminal work in this direction was Howard Becker’s
Art Worlds (1982). In the tradition of the ‘production of culture’ school, it
moved away from an artist-centred account of the workings of the New York
art scene to include a range of intermediaries, impresarios, agents, gallery
owners, lawyers, craftspeople, technicians and specialist material suppliers.
Becker (and later, Diana Crane’s The Production of Culture (1992)) attempted
the sectoral approach to localised cultural production that we saw with the
GLC and later value-chain analysis. In the later 1990s, economic geography
(itself undergoing a ‘cultural turn’) began to link research around networks and
clusters, innovative milieux and the competitive advantage of place to the
specific question of the cultural industries. In so doing, they were forced to
grapple with the connections between the cultural qualities of place and their
economic performance. Alfred Marshall’s (1890) notion of the ‘atmosphere’ of
a place giving it competitive advantage, translated usually as locally embedded
tacit knowledge, became linked to more explicitly cultural dimensions when
transferred to the field of cultural industries. Castells and Hall (1994), writing
about innovative milieux, certainly emphasised the rich institutional depth of
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the City – with universities, research and development institutions and
companies, government agencies, availability of skills and know-how – but
their focus on ‘technopoles’ and science parks did not directly fit with the
milieux of cultural industries. 
The work of Alan Scott, Andy Pratt and others began to push these
connections. In Scott’s The Cultural Economy of Cities (2000) and later articles
(2001; 2002; 2004; 2006) he attempts to link the economic geography
literature with empirical investigation of the cultural industries. He calls this
‘cultural commodity production’ which necessarily involves high levels of
human input, organised as clusters of small companies working on a project
basis, where teams, partnerships and alliances dissolve and re-form constantly
(cf. Bilton, 2007). They rely on dense flows of information, goods and services,
and benefit from economies of scale in skills-sourcing and know-how. These
local clusters involve complex divisions of labour – driven especially by new
ICT developments – all of which work to tie people to places. Andy Pratt’s
investigations of San Francisco and other ‘cool places’ also work within these
ideas (2000; 2002; 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; 2006). Indeed, researchers within
human geography have begun to provide much needed empirical investigation
of networking and clustering in different locations and sub-sectors of the
cultural industries. 
Others came at this from the perspective of the entrepreneurs themselves.
Work conducted by the Manchester Institute for Popular Culture (MIPC)
(Redhead, 1990; O’Connor and Wynne, 1996; 1998) presented a more positive
interpretation of contemporary urbanism and the role of cultural entrepreneurs
and intermediaries within it than Zukin (1995). It suggested that the line
between ‘cultural’ and ‘economic’ activities in the sector was fluid, not just
between the subsidised and non-subsidised ends of the spectrum but within
cultural entrepreneurs and businesses. The difficult business model of the
cultural industries - one whereby the economic value of any product was
linked to an uncertain future cultural value, and in which such product ideas
had to operate in a collaboration with a number of other freelancers or small
businesses, or indeed with a few very big businesses – meant that networks
helped actors manage the inherent riskiness of their business (Banks et al,
2000; Raffo et al, 2000; Shorthose, 2004; Bilton, 2007). 
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4.3 Networking and the innovative milieu 
Networking in the cultural industries has provided a rich research vein in
recent years (Crewe, 1996; Coe, 2000; 2001; Grabher, 2001; 2002; 2004;
Wittel, 2001; Ettlinger, 2003; Jeffcutt, 2004; Sturgeon, 2003; Nachum and
Keeble, 2003; Neff, 2004; Mossig, 2004; Kong, 2005; Lange, 2005; Johns,
2006). This reflects a much wider concern with the subject, suggesting to
some a complete new organisation and ‘spirit’ of capitalism itself (Boltanski
and Chiapello, 2005). In particular it suggests the new forms of self-
organisation of SME networks, and indeed, the replication of networked
organisation within the structures of large, global companies (Amin and
Cohendet, 1999; Grabher, 2001; 2004). 
Grabher (2001) sees the cultural industries as organised in two sorts of
networks, those within the global corporation (or group of companies) and
those within localities (the ‘village’) – both are ‘heterarchies’, self-regulating
systems that allow not simply learning or adaptation but future-orientated
‘adaptability’. At the corporate level, there are instituted forums of debate and
communication and a general aim to break up established understandings and
practices. At the local ‘village’ level it is the communal context of skills,
biographies and cultural orientations, often strongly tied to a sense of place,
which acts as a kind of self-regulating ecosystem, an extremely adaptive
heterarchy. Grabher argues that collaboration in projects is often about short-
term relationships – in that sense networks are not necessarily about relations
of personal trust – but that on dissolution they persist as latent networks ready
to be re-activated. He argues further that if projects are about learning, this is
remembered not by the individual participants but in the networks themselves,
thus embedded in place (2004). 
Wittel (2001) argued that the loose social ties of the urban cultural milieu were
used by freelancers and businesses as a way of gaining knowledge and
contacts in a quite instrumental manner. Indeed, it represented a new form of
‘network sociality’ in which ‘catch up’ and quite rapid exchanges of
information was replacing the longer established connections of a ‘narrative
based’ community sociality – one that built up a common mutual
understanding over some time. This instrumentalisation of networks is echoed
by McRobbie, 2002). But other work suggests that the use (or abuse) of such
personal connections takes place within certain limits set by the culture, or
regulative eco-system, of these local networks which work to establish trust
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(Kong, 2005). Equally, there are many gradations of networking and many
forms of inclusion/exclusion which act to negotiate the personal/professional
ambiguities involved. Banks (2007) wants to stress that cultural industry
networks are embedded within a local ‘moral economy’ that limits the abuses
of network sociality by reputation and other social sanctions. 
There has certainly been increasing emphasis on that indefinable
‘atmosphere’, the buzz, the scene, the genius loci, which make up a ‘creative
milieu’ (Hall, 1998; 2000). Research suggested that freelancers and micro
businesses – what Leadbeater and Oakley (1999) called ‘the independents’ –
often began as part of a localised ‘scene’, they were ‘active consumers’, ‘near
to the street’, and this gave them an insider’s knowledge of the volatile and
localised logic of cultural consumption – potentially a highly valued and
essential skill (O’Connor and Wynne, 1996; Crewe and Beaverstock, 1998;
Shorthose, 2004; Lloyd, 2006). These informal networks were often as
important as more formal institutional and business networks (Currid, 2007),
As a result, independent producers were able to construct a new sense of
cultural identity and purpose, using the mix of cultural and commercial
knowledge which this new form of cultural production necessarily involved.
The term ’habitus’ describes this mix of emotional investment and calculation,
of creativity and routinisation, of making money and making meaning, of
operating in a volatile, risky environment, using networks of trust and of
information which has to be learned by these producers. As Leadbeater and
Oakley wrote of these ‘independents’: 
They thrive on easy access to local, tacit know-how – a style, a look, a
sound – which is not accessible globally. Thus the cultural industries based
on local know-how and skills show how cities can negotiate a new
accommodation with the global market, in which cultural producers sell
into much larger markets but rely on a distinctive and defensible local bias
(1999:14). 
Scott (2004a) also links cultural commodity production strongly to the City.
Cities have those facilities, institutions, embedded knowledge and practices
which are crucial to creative urban milieux; as he puts it, cities are
‘collectivities of human activity and interest that continually create streams of
public goods that sustain the workings of the creative field’ (Scott, 2001:3).
Cities, in fact, are urban ecosystems within which cultural innovation thrives;
they are not a globalising juggernaut but thrive across a range of diverse
production locales. Cultural production and consumption transform the city
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through its ‘shopping malls, restaurants and cafés, clubs, theatres, galleries,
boutiques’ (ibid: 7). This ‘revitalisation of the symbolic content’ of cities draws
in city governments, linking these transformations with ‘ambitious public
efforts of urban rehabilitation in the attempt to enhance local prestige, increase
property values and attract new investments and jobs’ (ibid: 7). 
Here the cultural industry agenda is joined explicitly with that of culture-led
urban regeneration. Richard Florida’s (2002) idea of the ‘creative class’, where
an ’agglomeration’ of ‘creative professions’ is deemed to be attracted first and
foremost by the quality of life, tolerance or creative feel of a city, captured this
link for many cities willing to pay his fees. Though thick with statistics Florida’s
book is marked by an absence of any empirical investigation into what is, in
fact, only very circumstantial evidence It conflates ‘creative’ occupations in a
way similar to the ‘creative economy’ of Howkins – lawyers, scientists,
managerial and business professionals as well as ‘cultural’ creatives. It also
suggests that they can be attracted by a consumption strategy hard to
distinguish from classic gentrification and unlikely to benefit artists. (Healy,
2002b; Peck, 2005; Montgomery, 2005; Nathan, 2005; Markusen, 2006;
Oakley, 2009b). It is also clear that developers have become increasingly
aware of the symbolic value of ‘new economy’ and creative industry
businesses for real estate value (Guy and Hennebury, 2002; Guy et al, 2005;
Nevarez, 2003; O’Connor and Gu, 2010).
Such ‘creative class’ strategies partly overlap with those of cultural clusters.
These tend to be government planned or directed with a mix of subsidised
and commercial activities. Building partly on Porter’s work (1989a; 1989b) and
that of economic geography (see 3.3 above), but also coming from a tradition
of cultural precincts or quarters, clusters were closely liked to urban
regeneration initiatives – with mixed results (Mommaas, 2004; 2009). More
recently they seem to be linked to interventions concerned to protect from the
effects of gentrification, or at least to manage the process in ways that does
not stifle the small creative businesses that started the process (Evans and
Foord, 2005; Lehtovuori and Hasik, 2009). In many respects, creative space
strategies are coming closer to cultural policy, or at least trying to find ways of
attenuating the dysfunctions of ‘regeneration’. This echoes growing concern
away from the competitive city to the ‘good city’ (Amin, 2006).
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As the DCMS definition had it, the
creative industries were those
‘which have their origin in
individual creativity, skill and
talent and which have a potential
for wealth and job creation
through the generation and
exploitation of intellectual
property’ (DCMS, 1998:3).
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5.1 New Labour, new spirit
In 1997 when New Labour were elected, the Department of National
Heritage became the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). Its
new head, Chris Smith - now with ministerial status (i.e. part of the Cabinet)
- had long been associated with New Labour’s cultural policies, having
published a book very much associated with the party’s new take on this
issue (Smith, 1998). This marked a new status for cultural policy and the
cultural industries in particular. The renaming of these as ‘creative industries’
and the setting up of a ‘creative industries task force’ involving many big
names from the film, music, fashion and games sectors seemed part of the
celebratory optimism and the political hype around ‘Cool Britannia’ that was
associated with New Labour. Whilst this was certainly the case – and they
were also caught up in the inevitable backlash against Blair’s supposed PR-
led policy-making style – there were much deeper issues at stake.
The new profile of the DCMS, along with the publication of a glossy
‘mapping document’, firmly established the cultural industries as a legitimate
object of policy (DCMS, 1998). Backed by some rather optimistic statistics of
employment and wealth creation, a handy definition and a list of 13 sub-
sectors with clear links to statistical sources, the document allowed local
authorities, development agencies, arts organisations and consultancies
across the UK to place cultural industry strategies at the heart of local and
regional cultural and economic strategies (DCMS 2000; 2004; Taylor, 2006).
After long neglect, creative industries were now also linked to national
cultural and economic policy. The smallest and newest department began
talking to the very large and well established Department of Trade and
Industry in a way unthinkable a few years before. The cultural industries,
previously ignored or lumped with ‘the Arts’, were to become central to a
new contemporary image for Britain and high-profile exemplars of the
creativity and innovation that were to remake Britain for the 21st century.
Indeed, the Creative Industries Mapping Document itself became a lead
export, as governments and cities in Europe (especially the new or aspirant
EC member countries), in Latin America and particularly in the Far East saw
a new idea for the dynamic association of culture, economics and a new
wave of modernisation (Wang, 2004; O’Connor, 2006; Kong, et al, 2006).
5 Creative industries
This was not simply a re-assertion of social justice against the hard headed
economics of Thatcherism, something popular culture articulated throughout
the 1980s to little political effect. During the 1990s these popular
oppositional currents were articulating a new attitude to the market and to
entrepreneurialism, one that could link to a contemporary sense of social
justice, ‘authentic’ culture and economic viability. New Labour built on
currents of oppositional popular culture articulated in the form of the
emergent discourse around cultural industries, creativity and socially
responsible entrepreneurialism (Redhead, 2004). Visions of a new economic
order centred on more fluid patterns of work and career; a life course
demanding more individual responsibility in exchange for autonomy, an
economy based not on cut-throat competition but on the more open
collaborations of projects and networks, rewards for individual creativity and
innovation away from the fixed hierarchies of class and corporation – these
were the sort of arguments which meant New Labour and the cultural
industries were natural partners. The sort of economic and cultural
conjunction made in the 1980s in France (Rigby, 1991) happened – if in
different ways and through different paths – in Britain in the 1990s.
The embarrassment of ‘Cool Britannia’ (Harris, 2003), taking its place next to
Michael Foot’s donkey jacket in a pantheon of political clichés, was not
simply a PR stunt (and it echoed the earlier experiences of Jack Lang in the
Mitterrand Government in France). It represented a symbolic rapprochement
with post-1960s popular culture – with its transgressions, enthusiasms,
rebellions and anti-structures (Martin, 1981). It was a reconciliation with that
decade, the ‘sixties’, which Thatcher had considered the root of Britain’s
decline. Now, it was to be the basis of the country’s future success. 
5.2 Only a name?
The most striking innovation of the new DCMS was a change of terminology
- no longer cultural industries but creative industries. The shift has led to
much debate around definitions, which it is common to dismiss as ‘one for
the academics’. In fact the terminological confusions and slippages are
amongst the most important aspects of the question, because they bring
into play a whole range of correspondences and tensions around the issues
of culture, technology and economics (Hesmondhalgh, 2007).
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Chris Smith presented it as a purely pragmatic move in order to get some
key spending plans past the Treasury, where the word ‘culture’ had to be
avoided as too reminiscent of ‘the arts’, and thus not about economics at all
(Cunningham, 2002; Redhead, 2004; Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005;
Selwood, 2006). Pragmatic or not, the change of terminology was not
neutral; it served to uncouple the ‘creative industries’ from ‘arts and cultural’
policy, yet hoping at the same time to recoup (some of) the benefits for
those very arts and cultural policy agencies. Crucial to this political trick was
the identification of the creative industries with a ‘new economy’ driven by
‘digital’ technologies and closely related to the ‘information’ or ‘knowledge’
economy. It was the exploitation of intellectual property (IP) rights that was
seen to provide the crucial link between these agendas – positioning the
creative industries at the forefront of economic competitiveness. As the
DCMS definition had it, the creative industries were those ‘which have their
origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for
wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of
intellectual property’ (DCMS, 1998:3).
This connection to the ‘information’ or ‘knowledge economy’ was at the
heart of the important critique of the DCMS strategy by Garnham (2005),
where he too presented the ‘creative’ shift as pragmatic - one, indeed, that
scooped up ‘software’ employment to make the statistics look even more
impressive to the Treasury. Garnham pointed to the over-inflated claims for
this new economy (something the ‘dot-com’ boom underlined) and this was
a common line of criticism (cf. Pratt 2005). In particular he argued that the
knowledge or information involved in science and R&D, business-to-
business services and creative industries were very different from each
other. This point was also made by Healy (2002b). He targeted John
Howkin’s (2001) notion of the ‘creative economy’, which included all those
activities covered by intellectual property in some form – design, trademark,
copyright and patents. Healy suggested this lumps together a whole range
of activities and businesses which, underneath the hype, was not useful and
often confusing.
Garnham, building on the central insights of the political economy school –
of which many currently working in the creative industries field are simply
ignorant – suggests also that the new concern with IP rights is an attempt to
overcome one of the key restrictions on profitability in the cultural industries
– the tendency of cultural goods to become public goods (Garnham, 2005).
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Strengthened IP regulations help keep cultural goods as commodities, just
as new rounds of mergers and convergence allow the new media
companies to keep a control over distribution. These raise important issues
for smaller cultural producers, and for the public sphere as a whole. Debates
around IP are now one of the central political questions of the
cultural/creative industries (cf. Hesmondhalgh, 2007)
I suggested above that the GLC’s policy had emphasised, not the individual
artist, but the ‘sector’- the value-chain, the range of creative and ancillary
functions and inputs that make the production of culture possible. The
DCMS definition used ‘creative’ as a quality that could be exploited by
individuals as individuals – or at least those possessed of ‘individual
creativity, skill and talent’. The industrial sector disappeared into a host of
entrepreneurial creatives generating intellectual property rights. 
The immediate problem was that the DCMS definition simply did not
describe the complex structure of the creative industries sector, nor the
employment and remuneration arrangements of the majority of those within
it. The definition thus encouraged a deeper delusion, that policies to support
and encourage such creative entrepreneurialism would suffice as an
industrial strategy. It became a small business strategy which, whatever the
merits of its particular implementations, found it difficult to address
structural sectoral questions - value-chains, missing skills and professions,
access to space and technology, development of and entry into new
markets, linkage to the manufacturing/materials sectors – and more
seriously, to do anything about it when it did identify problems (Pratt, 2005).
In part this was related to the lack of sectoral or sub-sectoral organisations
which could act as representational industry bodies at policy level (though
these are much more common now); but it also related to the lack of
resources given to such an industry strategy and the absence of any real
intelligence about it. The ‘Cultural Observatories’, set up as part of the new
Regional Development Agencies and Regional Cultural Consortia, around
2002-3, were massively under-funded and had to service (sometimes with
only one or two employees) the research and intelligence requirements of
the whole cultural sector – which included ‘the arts and culture’, heritage,
libraries, museums and archives, tourism, sport, entertainment and leisure. 
This emphasis on a universal quality of creativity had two further
consequences. First, it suggested that with a bit of intelligence and will-power
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any city, town or rural area could develop the creative industries as part of its
economic regeneration; as a universal attribute creativity was available to all.
Yet all the statistics clearly indicate that the creative industries are
concentrated in one very big (London) and a few smaller metropolitan centres
(Oakley, 2004; 2007). Second, if using the word ‘creative’ allowed the cultural
industries to link with the wider innovation and competitiveness agenda, it also
brought with it that distinct charge of artistic ‘flair’ strongly associated with
popular culture. As we have seen, this was essential to New Labour’s
command of the modernising agenda. Creativity could thus be mobilised
within ‘socially excluded groups’, in particular ethnic minorities and inner urban
areas subject to schemes for ‘regeneration’. Creative entrepreneurialism
provided for an economic and social agenda delivered through cultural policy.
But such policies ignored real contradictions between the different agendas,
and it was often unclear as to which one it was supposed to be addressing
(Oakley, 2006; 2007; Evans and Shaw, 2004). 
5.3 The specificity of culture
The price paid for the re-branding of the creative industries was a lack of
clarity as to their specificity and distinctiveness. What did they do differently
to science, or business services, or indeed the service sector generally;
were they part of economic or cultural policy, and how did those two
dimensions relate? Did their distinctiveness consist in them having a unique
and perhaps difficult business model, or were their inputs and outputs
something that went beyond economic measurement and indicators?
The problem was that it was hard to distinguish between what was
considered ‘creative’ in this sector and in others, such as science, without
some reference to a specific ‘cultural’ or ‘artistic’ dimension; but this always
tended to undermine its hard edged economic credentials. Although nodding
to the far flung reaches of the creative economy, the DCMS definition (1998)
– unlike Howkins’ (2001) – results in a fairly conventional list. It includes ‘the
arts’, and the classic cultural industries sector – adding design, fashion and,
more controversially, ‘software’ to these. It set these firmly within a robust
economic agenda, but with few guidelines as to how exactly this was to be
differentiated from more traditional cultural policy. 
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This ambiguous situation provoked some criticism. The first, and most vocal,
concerned the status of ‘the arts’. In part a continuation of the complaints
about bureaucracy, targets, managerialism and general ‘philistinism’ that
began under the Conservatives, it ran into the new ‘impacts’ agenda set by
the DCMS – for social inclusion, urban regeneration and economic growth
(Reeves, 2002; Selwood, 1999, 2002; 2004). Increased funding for the
DCMS involved the delivery of wider social and economic objectives; and
many cultural institutions and individual artists resented the consequent
bureaucracy. But, as pragmatic as this may have been, it also reflected an
existing commitment by publicly funded cultural institutions to the efficient
use of resources and the effective engagement with the needs and desires
of their publics. 
Part of the debate concerned the techniques and politics of measurement
itself. Selwood (2002; 2004) argued that measurement tends to be ad hoc
and incoherent, possessing little scientific status. On the other hand, even
if done correctly ‘evidence based policy’ is more about politics than
evidence – the latter often simply ignored. But the problem might lie with
the notion of ‘evidence based policy’ itself. Rather than search for
indisputable objective impacts, ultimately the question would need
addressing at the level of political values (Oakley, 2006; Oakley et al, 2006).
Tessa Jowell’s intervention as Secretary of State at the DCMS suggested
as much (Jowell, 2004). She did not resist measurement or wider social
and economic effects per se but tried to identify a distinct and relatively
autonomous sphere of activity for ‘culture’. This concern to identify a
distinct role for culture continued in the growing use of the concept of
‘public value’, which suggested that the different values associated with
culture could be justified as public values in themselves without external
‘impacts’, and put forward a public policy framework within which these
could be legitimised (Holden 2004; Keaney, 2006).
These concerns with ‘the arts’ – often descending into political point scoring
as charges of ‘elitism’ and ‘dumbing down’ were slung across the floor –
could often seem of marginal concern, but were in fact at the heart of the
creative industries debate. On the one hand the arts could be positioned as
minority and elitist. Despite the talk of economic and social agendas, it was
still the traditional arts institutions that accounted for the vast majority of
national and local government spending in this sphere (Feist, 2001). Surveys
continue to emphasise the consumption of arts along familiar class lines
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(Gayo-Cal et al, 2006).For the arts agencies this was a crisis of legitimacy;
not only did ‘excellence’ in the arts run up against the universality of
creativity (Garnham, 2005; Selwood, 2009) but it suggested that ‘market
failure’, rather than a justification for subsidy, might in fact be a democratic
judgement on art’s historical redundancy. In these circumstances, apart
from a retreat to heritage (or ‘cultural infrastructure’) more pragmatic
justifications of the arts as either ‘R&D’ and ‘inputs’ into the creative
industries (Holden, 2007) or via metrics of public preference (Bakhshi et al,
2009) come to the fore. It is clear some new public policy justification is
required (Holden, 2008).
On the other hand, if ‘the arts’ were merely one (expensive, subsidised)
preference amongst all other consumer preferences, then where did that
leave the discourses of aesthetic critique and cultural policy that had been
extended from the arts to the wider field of the cultural industries, and
indeed been part of the wider socio-cultural transformations associated with
their growth? Hartley (2005), for example, sees the marginalisation of ‘art’ as
one with the universalisation of creativity; its demise is both a victory for
democracy and heralds the end of that art-industry divide inaugurated by
aesthetics and cultural policy. Now popular culture was as valid as ‘art’,
creative-citizenship an outcome of producer-consumers constructing
individual lifestyles, and creative entrepreneurship a possibility for all. Such
an account simply wipes out the contradictions of the cultural commodity
and the need for cultural policy (other than ‘digital literacy’) at a stroke. As
we shall see, this articulation of creative industries is symptomatic of some
deep-seated shifts, but fails to grasp what is at stake.
Hesmondhalgh (2007) - in agreeing with Pratt that the concept of ‘creativity’
fails to adequately distinguish ‘the creative industries’ - holds to the term
‘cultural industries’ as the production and circulation of symbolic texts. He
excludes ‘the arts’ as non-industrial, and fashion and design as about the
application of the ‘cultural’ or ‘symbolic’ to primarily functional goods. In so
doing he gives full weight to the socio-political issues around media
representation (the distorting effects of markets and monopoly etc.) that
Hartley so signally ignores (Garnham, 2003).But, I would suggest, on the one
hand this tends to play down those aesthetic contradictions – of intrinsic
meaning/accumulation, sensuous particularity/universal (exchange)
equivalence – that have also been central to cultural industries debates. On
the other it fails to register the full significance of the extension of ‘cultural’
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inputs into the wider economy of goods and services – and how it situates
these aesthetic contradictions in a new register. This can be seen in debates
over definition.
5.4 Definitions
Definitional questions have been central to cultural and creative industry
debates for a number of reasons. They guide the statistical ‘mapping’ of the
sector’s size and distribution and have been crucial for policy-makers and
lobby groups who need to show how economically important they are and
thus worthy of government support and intervention. As we saw, for
example, the (rather dubious) inclusion of ‘software’ in the DCMS definition
was very important to its positioning of the sector as the industry of the
future. Definitional debates frequently relate to the intrinsic difficulties of
identifying new occupations and businesses within a statistical structure still
based on an old agriculture-industry-service framework. This was not only a
numbers game however; how to distinguish the sector and to articulate it as
a manageable policy object demanded some real conceptual work.
5.4.1 David Throsby
David Throsby, coming from a background of arts economics, gives us a
traditional concentric circle model of the cultural industries, and it is a widely
used model in creative and cultural policy consultancy.
Core creative arts: Literature; Music; Performing arts; Visual arts.
Other core cultural industries: Film; Museums and libraries.
Wider cultural industries: Heritage services; Publishing; Sound recording;
Television and Radio; Video and computer games
Related industries: Advertising; Architecture; Design; Fashion (Throsby,
2001; 2007)
Throsby arranges the cultural industries as a hierarchy in which ‘creativity’
seems to reside in its purest form in the traditional art forms. This is a re-
working of standard cultural policy distinctions between high and low based
on the potential for commercial mass reproduction. Art is the creative bit;
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industry is ‘applied’. Hence ‘literature’ and ‘music’ are ‘core creative’ whilst
publishing and sound recording are placed outside in ‘wider cultural
industries’. Those functional industries incorporating ‘creativity’ –
architecture, fashion etc. – are merely ‘related’.
The problem here is partly statistical, these clearly being suggested as a way
of counting employment based on standard occupational/industrial codes. At
the same time, as with many such policies,  it does have historical baggage
– the arts do exist and for the time being at least, need funding and to take
their place in a wider cultural policy model. Nevertheless, it tends to repeat a
classic cultural policy tautology: the arts are most ‘purely’ creative because
not commercialised, but they are distinguished as a specific ‘arts’ sector
precisely on the grounds of their not being part of a commercial ‘industry’.
Translated into everyday cultural policy; if you are commercially viable you do
not qualify for subsidy, and if you do qualify you must by definition be more
purely creative. It is a repeat of that mistake both Williams (1981) and Miege
(1987; 1989) identified, where artistic creation is clearly distinguished from
its subsequent reproduction and commercialisation. This sort of model,
which sees ‘the arts’ either as pure creativity and/or providing the raw
material subsequently ‘commercialised’ by the cultural industries, fails to
give an adequate account of the real processes at work in the sector, and
evades some of the real tensions between creative labour and the
conditions in which it is put to work. It also posits a kind of ‘individual
genius’ or auteur approach that fails to address the collaborative nature of
creative production or the way in which the ‘industry’ actively constitutes
the ‘artistic’ or generative creative product. 
There are two further consequences. First, it can make no sense of
‘creativity’ in design or fashion, these lying at the outer reaches of the
creative economy; it leaves them as primarily ‘industrial’ or functional.
Second, as in standard cultural policy models, grounding creativity primarily
on ‘the arts’ and thus justifying their continued subsidy, it leaves the rest of
the creative industries to the purview of economic policy. The arts need
protection; commercial and popular culture can look after itself. 
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5.4.2 KEA Model
This model was more or less reproduced in a 2006 European Commission
report (KEA, 2006), and more explicitly distinguishes ‘core arts’, ‘cultural
industries’ and ‘creative industries’ (Fig.1: KEA, 2006)
Figure 1 (KEA, 2006)
EU Cultural and Creative Sector
The distinction of arts/ cultural industries is here made on the grounds of
reproduction and, to a lesser extent, the exercise of copyright; that is, in
terms of its ‘industrialisation’. Creative industries are now ‘non-cultural’ but
employ creative people, by which they mean ‘people … trained in the arts’.
Again, culture, creativity and ‘the arts’ are synonymous; as the key ‘input’
they justify subsidy - and as they are only peripheral to the ‘creative
industries’ these latter therefore must be ‘non-cultural’. Many of the points
made in respect of Throsby apply here; but we might also ask, after fifty
years of cultural studies, in what ways are fashion and design, architecture
and advertising ‘non-cultural’? On this model they are excluded by reason of
not being ‘the arts’. Again, this might be useful for the task of arranging
employment statistics but it does not work as a definition.
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Circles Sectors Sub-sectors Characteristics
Core Arts Fields Visual Arts Crafts Non industrial activities
Performing Arts Painting Copyright may apply but
Heritage Sculpture is not always exercised
Photography
Cultural Industries Film & Video Recorded & live music, Industrial Sectors aimed
TV & Radio collecting societies at massive reproduction
Videogames Book & magazine Copyright important
Music publishing
Books & Press
Creative Industries Design Fashion design Sectors described as
and activities Architecture Graphic Design ‘non cultural’ although
Advertising Interior Design they employ creative
Product design skills and creative people
i.e. people who have 
been trained in the arts
5.4.3 The Work Foundation
Recently The Work Foundation (WF) (2007), working with the DCMS, has
proposed a model that also draws on Throsby (Fig. 2). At the centre is a
‘creative core’; this is not now defined as ‘the arts’ but includes all forms of
‘original product’ – popular culture certainly but also certain computer
programmes. Next are the ‘cultural industries’ – the ‘classic’ list including
film, TV, radio, music industries, computer games etc. – which attempt to
commercialise these creative products. Finally we have the ‘creative
industries’ which include original product but mix it with a certain
functionality – buildings have to stand up, advertising has to sell, clothes
have to be worn, design has to work. Beyond these are wider parts of the
economy which use creative input – design led- manufacture such as Dyson
or service brands such as Virgin, selling an ‘experience’ which depends on
creative inputs.
Though the WF report still uses ‘creative industries’ in its title, it is an
attempt to avoid the problems of using ‘creative’ to characterise the sector.
First it distinguishes the ‘creative industries’ from the knowledge economy
as a whole, positioning them as a sub-sector within it. Second, the report
does not use ‘creative’ as the quality distinguishing the particular products of
this sector – creativity as common to all acts of origination and innovation in
science, business etc. – but instead uses the notion of ‘expressive value’.
This value is most undiluted at the creative core, and more mixed with
functionality as we move to the periphery. 
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Figure 2 (Work Foundation, 2007: 5) 
This is certainly a more coherent model than that previously presented by
the DCMS, and it re-inserts the specificity of ‘culture’ into creativity. Unlike
Throsby and KEA, the creative core is not exclusively the domain of ‘the
arts’. The concentric circles thus do not construct a hierarchy based on pure
and applied art – with the historic baggage this carries – but simply range
products along a continuum of ‘expressive’ and functional value.
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Key to this shift is the replacement of ‘creative’ by ‘expressive’ value. Why
expressive rather than symbolic? Maybe the latter word is somewhat
academic, or sounds rather ‘cultural’ when run past the hard-nosed
economic ministries. The WF report defines expressive value as ‘every
dimension which…enlarges cultural meaning and understanding’ (2007:96).
Whilst ‘expressive’ has some connections to ‘creativity’ it is clearly situated
on the ground of culture as meaning system(s). Thus the report endorses
Throsby’s list of different values associated with culture – aesthetic, spiritual,
social, historic, symbolic, and authentic. These are also the same terms that
Holden (2004) used to define the different dimensions of the ‘public value’
for culture. That is to say, this ‘expressive’ value – now clearly the basis for a
whole range of major industrial activities - involves cultural values, the same
cultural values at stake in contemporary cultural policy. A clear connection is
implied between economic and cultural policy; these cultural values have
very real economic impacts but they are also valuable and legitimate in their
own rights. 
To an extent, this is a return to the policy connections sketched by the GLC,
but is not at all explicit. The ‘creative industries’ are of economic importance
- and ‘publicly funded culture’ (the arts) is, for Holden (2007) a crucial input
into these. This is a pragmatic justification and echoes Throsby and KEA. But
the ‘culture’ involved in expressive value, though presumably deeply
informed by ‘the arts’, is not co-terminous with it but extends into the
anthropological ‘everyday culture’ associated with Williams’ ‘culture as a
way of life’ (1975). The issue this throws up for critical cultural theory and
policy is not that of the industrialisation of ‘the arts’ but the industrialisation
of everyday culture. For these are the terms on which the cultural industries
became the creative industries – the new industry of the future.
Featherstone’s (1996) ‘aesthetisisation of everyday life’ and Lash and Urry’s
(1994) ‘culturalisation of the economy’ register some of the consequences
of Rimbaud’s ‘change life’, of the ‘artistic critique of capitalism’ as it filtered
through both cultures of consumption and – we have suggested in our
discussion of local creative entrepreneurs – production. This does not, as
Hartley (2005) suggests, mean an end to the arts-industry separation, but its
transposition to a new register.
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5.4.4 Excluding the arts
As we suggested (pp 37 – 38 above), in choosing to leave out the arts
Hesmondhalgh (2007) sets aside a sector with a very high prestige function,
commanding huge levels of public investment (from education through
urban regeneration/re-imaging to arts funding) and highly commercialised in
certain areas (contemporary art exhibitions; fine art auctions; opera; popular
theatre, music theatre, etc.). It excludes a sector that does have many inputs
and spill-overs into ‘cultural industries’. Not only does the ‘production and
circulation of symbolic texts’ inevitably have multiple connections to ‘the
arts’ (as Adorno made clear) but it is hard to conceive of a ‘creative city’ or
‘innovative’ milieu without the varied activities associated with these arts.
But I would also suggest that his exclusion works in tandem with that other
exclusion of ‘primarily functional’ goods and services – fashion, design,
architecture etc. I suggested above that the emphasis on ‘symbolic texts’
might over-emphasise the representational and cognitive function of the
cultural industries. The continued pre-eminence of the media as the central
cultural industry certainly needs underlining in the face or predictions of its
imminent irrelevance (see also Garnham, 2000) but it also underplays the
crucial importance of aesthetic critiques and debates. Leaving out the arts
leaves out these aesthetic debates; leaving out the ‘creative industries’
ignores how these debates have migrated to the ‘aesthetisisation of
everyday life’ and the ‘culturalisation of the economy’. 
5.4.5 Cultural commodity production 
That there is some distinction between the ‘cultural’ and ‘creative’
industries, or that there has been some kind of shift in the centre of gravity
of cultural economies - one that the DCMS definition clearly ‘fudged’ - is
widely felt, though inadequately theorised. Alan Scott (2004) tries to avoid
some of the problems of taxonomy by calling the sector ‘cultural commodity
production’. However he uses a service/manufacture distinction to separate
two different kinds of commodity. First, service outputs focused on
‘entertainment, edification, and information’ (e.g., motion pictures, recorded
music, print, media, or museums) and second, manufactured products
through which consumers construct distinctive forms of individuality, self-
affirmation, and social display. This is hardly sustainable; not only do
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‘services’ get embodied in a variety of manufactured objects (what Lash and
Lurry (2007) call the ‘thingification of the media’) but objects themselves are
saturated with ‘service’ – i.e. ‘creative’, ‘artistic’ or ‘design’– input. The
service/manufacture distinction is unhelpful, especially when the latter are
equated with identity construction and social display – as if this is not
involved in the consumption of music or print, for example.
5.4.6 ‘Embedded creatives’
The notion of ‘creative industries’, if inadequately explained by ‘creativity’,
does point to a proliferation of ‘symbolic’ or ‘cultural’ or ‘artistic’ input into a
range of goods and services that cannot be identified within ‘classic’ cultural
industries. This is registered by the work of Cunningham and others on
‘embedded creatives’ (Higgs et al, 2008). They put forward statistical evidence
that indicates more people with creative occupations working outside the
(more or less DCMS defined) creative industries than inside them. For
Cunningham this suggests that ‘creativity’ is now an input right across the
economy (2006); for KEA (2006) on the other hand, it suggests the input of
people ‘trained as artists’. For others the methodology is erroneous. At this
stage it is hard to say who these people are, how they identify themselves
and what skills they might have or need. Do they see themselves as artists
working in ‘industry’, as was noted already by Wolff 25 years ago (1981) and
re-emphasised recently by Oakley et al (2008)? Or are there new kinds of
identity formations? Design, for example, may be emerging as a term capable
of re-configuring the artist-centric pure-applied model - as engagement with a
range of social, political and environmental tasks picks up and transforms
many of the key socio-political concerns of modernism.
5.4.7 Creativity, innovation and novelty
In any respect, it is clear that the function of artistic, creative, or ‘immaterial’
labour is now not confined to traditional questions of creatives in
industrialised culture industries, but is a part of a much wider group of
activities. It is for this reason that debates around creative labour have
become so central – these extensively covered by Kate Oakley in this
literature review series (2009b). In the light of this proliferation, two further
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definitional moves might be discussed here. The first (Fig. 3: NESTA 2006) is
a pragmatic attempt to capture the diverse nature of cultural production and
different ways in which this product is ‘monetised’. It also suggests how
their complex overlap might be seen as a ‘creative ecosystem’. In these
ways it avoids the model of ‘creative inputs’ that are subsequently
industrialised and attempts to ground a taxonomy on the specific
organisation of production (Pratt and Jeffcut, 2009).
Figure 3 (NESTA, 2006: 55).
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A second definitional move avoids taxonomy altogether by suggesting that
the creative industries are not an ‘industry’ at all, but part of the innovation
system of the economy (Potts et al, 2008; Hartley, 2008). This model of the
creative industries wants to connect Schumpeterian evolutionary economics,
the revolutionary rhetoric of web 2.0 and a particular ‘active audience’ strand
of cultural studies. It tries to answer one of the problems posed to neo-
classical economics by the creative industries. Markets are ideally supposed
to work on perfect information, assigning price to known use-values. But the
creative industries deal in novelty, unknown value, so how can markets
assign price? They do so through the value placed on them by others,
through interaction across social networks. ‘Social network markets’ then
are about assigning value to novel things. This value is not necessarily
economic (fan cultures begin and often remain purely social) but it is always
potentially so as they begin to accumulate ‘attention’ (Lanham, 2006).
Novelty – ‘innovation’ – therefore enters the economic system via social
network markets; as those dealing above all with the production of
‘unknown values’, the creative industries are therefore synonymous with the
innovation system.
But, like ‘creativity’, ‘novelty’ covers a huge spectrum; Potts et al identify
nanotechnology, 19thcentury bicycles and 20th century mass tourism as
being creative industries in their emergent stages. On the same basis ‘the
arts’, being known values, are not creative industries at all. There is a basic
confusion at work here. As we have seen, the difficult business model of
the cultural industries was identified not just by ‘neo-classical’ economists
like Caves (2000) but also the Marxist political economy school (Garnham,
(2000) discusses novelty in detail). But though these industries do produce
‘novelty’ this does not exhaust what they do. As Potts et al. suggest later,
these social networks are producing economic and ‘symbolic’ value (p. 169).
Symbolic value, novel or otherwise, works within wider, complex systems of
signification that we might call ‘cultural’. Novelty is produced within a
signifying system; in fact ‘novelty’ is better described in relational terms as
‘difference’. Social network markets work with values that therefore need to
be understood within wider cultural systems – as well as within social,
spatial, and political contexts.
This model also purports to overturn the linear value-chain triad of (active)
producer – distribution/content – and (passive) audience they associate with
the cultural industries. The creative industries, they argue, reconfigure this
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triad as active audience/agents, networks and enterprises – ‘engaged in the
mutual enterprise of creating values, both
symbolic and economic’ (p.169).Are we to assume there are no more large
corporations but merely ‘enterprises’; does ‘network’ refer to social
networks or the hugely expensive infrastructures on which the Internet
relies, or logistical chains associated with Amazon, or the global franchises
of Hollywood theatre distribution; does ‘mutual enterprise’ mean an equal
share in value? In short, calling it a ‘complex open system’ rather than an
industry suggests an emancipatory redistribution of power, ownership and
control that is never discussed in any detail, except through the figure of the
‘active consumer’, seemingly now in the driving seat. 
The active citizen-consumer constructs her own identity not within the
hierarchical cultural narratives of the nation-state (the ‘consciousness
industry’) but from the symbolic resources of global creative industries. The
arrival of web 2.0 technologies with their potential for co-created value
seems to imply for this model the redundancy of ‘political economy’
questions – around control, access, exploitation, ideology – and equally
those cultural policy concerns about what kinds of symbolic value are being
produced and under what conditions. That social and political identity can be
exclusively and unproblematically founded on such symbolic consumption,
or that this provides adequate resources for collective cohesion is, to say the
least, debatable. Hartley’s suggestion that global brands such as
MacDonald’s and Benetton provide the resources for such collective identity
and that this is more liberating than traditional cultural policy is equally
problematic (Hartley, 1999).
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That cultural policy should look to
provide merely the means for
economic growth to the exclusion
of concern for the means to
facilitate the creation of common
values is neither feasible nor
desirable. …the means to promote
cultural industries are precisely
cultural; to tie these to primarily
economic outputs is to abuse
these cultural means.
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6 Final thoughts
6.1 A whole different ball game?
Revising this report in early 2010, I was struck by the rapidity by which the
implications of the internet (especially web 2.0) and mobile communication
technologies had transformed debates on the creative industries. They
seemed to underline a radical shift in our understanding of art, culture and
economy. In the light of this I wanted to revisit the conclusion from the first
edition to draw upon some of these new debates.
6.2 Tensions in the cultural industries
When discussing tensions within the cultural industries, Adorno set up an
opposition of the sensuous particularity of the art object with its intrinsic
formal logic to that of the homogenised industrialised mass culture industry.
I have suggested in Section One many ways in which this model was never
entirely tenable, ignoring the real forms in which cultural commodity
production took place, and some of the social, cultural and political
possibilities with which cultural commodity production and consumption
could be invested. If culture sets a certain limit on capitalism’s drive to
accumulation, then there are always going to be difficulties in making
cultural policy in conjunction with economic policy. Conflicts are inevitable;
and Adorno’s tension persisted, between the intrinsic aesthetic or political-
critical values, and the commodity form and the industrial structures within
which they were produced. Hence there is a certain naivety in thinking that
adequate intelligence in and of itself can manage a complex creative cluster.
In fact this only works if a certain set of values are being shared. This is
what gives the UK situation a particular colouration, as opposed to Germany,
or Canada, or China. 
In attempting to mobilise culture for economic development public policy
has been forced to engage with specifically cultural meanings and ambitions
that have collective socio-political as well as economic value. Frequently
presented as win-win – what’s good for culture is good for the economy –
has led to policymakers demanding discriminations as to what kinds of
cultural industries, what kinds of growth and for whom.
These issues remain, but things are changing. In trying to pursue a cultural
policy through industrial intervention, the cultural industries agenda
represented a break with the more traditional focus on de-commodification,
identifying certain cultural goods as having public value which should thus be
provided for by state subsidy. The permeation of the economy by cultural
production forms has called for new kinds of (difficult to manage) skills and
business models previously restricted to the cultural industries. Indeed, the
term ‘creative industries’ expresses this as generalised ‘creativity’. However
I also suggest that these developments have been compounded by the
growth of the Internet on a number of levels. 
The first of these entails a shift in emphasis from analogue/physical to
digital/virtual. The implications for established cultural industries are far-
reaching, digitalisation presenting enormous problems for the monetisation
of their products. But, more fundamentally, the growing emphasis on trust,
emotional identification and privileged communication as crucial to building
an audience/consumer base attempts to reconfigure relationships previously
associated with intimate social networks and the heightened communion
associated with the live arts (Terranova, 2004).
Similarly, the socio-technical possibilities opened by web 2.0 allow levels of
audience interaction and co-creation which seem to realise the dreams of
Left modernism - overcoming of the division between artists and audience.
On the other hand, this dream of recapturing a direct relation with audience
(lost in modernity) can be set against its extreme fragmentation in post-
broadcast media and increased management by mechanical computation.
Direct input into the production process does not just come from creative
feedback but also in the form of the aggregation of mouse clicks.
Companies like Amazon, Google, and eBay use the information from millions
of dispersed clicks to personalise each computer screen. “Welcome, Justin,
we have some new suggestions just for you”. The internet brings new
possibilities for ‘authentic’ interaction, and at the same time for new kinds of
audience manipulation. 
It also changes the terms of opposition and critique. Lash and Lurry (2007)
point to the shift from the homogenising project of the ‘culture industry’ to
the production of difference by the ‘global culture industry’. For them,
difference is now a source not of opposition but of new economic value.
The avant-garde search for radical heterogeneity and irreducible particularity
has now been annexed by a global culture industry based on the
proliferation of niches, the quotidian ubiquity of cultural product and the
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consumer search for unceasing differentiation. They suggest that difference is
not now about the singular creative act but is created across social networks;
value arises from creative consumption as much as creative production.
Drawing on the swell of literature on the independent life of objects, (Lee and
Munroe, 2001; Thrift, 2008) we can find these objects (that is, cultural
products) circulating through these social networks, morphing and evolving in
ways not anticipated by their creators. The ability to intuit and monitor (using
professional ‘cool-hunting’ and computer analysis) and amplify these
transformations is now a central skill of the global culture industry (O’Connor
2004). The unprecedented access to tools of cultural production, of social
communication and collaboration hold great emancipatory potential; but these
have to be seen in relation to other tendencies: ‘We are dealing not just with
invention but power: the power of global and imperial capital’ (Lash and Lurry,
2007: 182). 
6.3 Global flows and collective identities
The digital flows of the Internet intertwine with the proliferation of objects as
markets do their work. Not only do objects get designed and assembled across
these networks, their distribution is organised by computer-driven logistical and
transport networks. Their presence in our lives is linked to the virtual icon-
brands of which they are the partial but never complete incarnation. Objects are
now more than objects; they embody the idea of the brand, which we can
never own, no matter how much we buy. Such a proliferation, combined with
the complexity and unpredictability of the global creation of value, seems to
defy conceptualisation in ways akin to the 18th century ‘sublime’3. Like the
trillions and trillions of transactions of the global financial system, the vast
complex circulation of objects now leaves us dumbfounded. For many, this
sheer excess has now become an unknowable ‘mass’; and mass consumption
is no longer the consumption of the same but the creative proliferation of
excessive heterogeneity (Lee and Munroe, 2000). Such paralysing awe might
not always be an option. The global financial crisis shows how such systems
demand analysis and intervention; so too the much more complex
environmental system which is also demanding such attention. Both of these
suggest that our consumption of creative objects cannot go on indefinitely. 
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3 This term was used by writers such as Burke and Kant to suggest something beyond our understanding, to which
we respond in ‘shock and awe’.
This rapid acceleration of the global flows of objects and symbols is often
celebrated as the ending of the nation-state and opening new possibilities
for global cosmopolitanism. However, at the same time as ‘DIY citizenship’
(Hartley, 1999) and the proliferation of individual consumer choice come to
the fore, so too does a new concern with the collective. Writers as different
as Leadbeater (2008) and Hardt and Negri (2004) are concerned with the
masses no longer corralled by the nation-state – the former seeing them as
economically productive, the other as potentially revolutionary. Such
celebrations need sober assessment. Cultural studies has long been
concerned to assert the claims of ‘common culture’ within the nation-state;
as Couldry (2006) argues, without such commonality there can be no claims
to justice. The nation-state is still a primary source of symbolic identification;
the global culture industry remains systematically incapable of fixing
collective symbolic meaning in any significant form but that of the brand. 
6.4 Cultural policy, autonomy and opposition
The QUT (Queensland University of Technology) group characterise cultural
policy as a form of regulation and social control. To some extent this is true;
but as Tony Bennett (1998) argues, such regulation and control is also
productive, and not simply repressive, as Hartley suggests (2005). In
particular, cultural policy has an evolving role in the assertion of public value.
This is of course wrapped up in power and social distinction; but over the
course of the last 40 years cultural policy has moved beyond a concern with
the arts, just as it is no longer about de-commodification. As the experience
with the BBC illustrates, contemporary cultural policy concerns a complex
set of issues at the intersection of culture and economics (Hesmondhalgh,
2005; 2007a). And to ignore this or to argue for a purely economic policy as
the QUT group often do is rather contradictory for both cultural and
economic reasons. A cultural industries policy is about both; it is not about
controlling content but about providing the space in which content that we
value might still be produced - hopefully with a beneficial economic
outcome. Not having an explicit cultural policy, is of course, also a cultural
policy, as is quite clear in the US.
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That cultural policy should look to provide merely the means for economic
growth to the exclusion of concern for the means to facilitate the creation of
common values is neither feasible nor desirable. I have already suggested
that the means to promote cultural industries are precisely cultural; to tie
these to primarily economic outputs is to abuse these cultural means. This is
that transposition of the concerns of aesthetics mentioned above. If the
aesthetic concern for radical heterogeneity has now become a sort of
machine for producing difference, niche products for discerning consumers,
then many also see an increasing rationalisation of creative labour. The
autonomy of creative labour was always pragmatically linked to both its
difficult management (‘herding cats’) and its over-supply (‘freedom to starve’)
(e.g. see Oakley 2009a); but there also was an argument that the intrinsic
value of what it produced demanded that autonomy. These claims have had
different social, cultural and political elements– but they are all concerned
with the collective value of symbolic production and the need to accord a
degree of autonomy to production. In a general way, the reduction of the
autonomy of creative labour is of a part with the reduction of the autonomy
of culture itself.
As it overturns traditional cultural business models, the Internet has also
challenged many of the justifications for creative autonomy. For every
account of exploited insecure creative labour there is rejoicing that another
job-for-life producer cartel has been over-thrown in favour of consumer co-
creation. Change there will be, but the direction of change is yet to be
decided; pitting producers against citizen-consumers is a recipe for disaster. 
Creative autonomy refers to those spaces in which symbolic production can
give adequate weight to the demands of their material – be it artistic,
creative, or craft – and to be in some control of the economic uses of that
material. This can apply to creative producers in a large company, but also to
those dispersed communities of practice that are the place-based networks
of creative entrepreneurs discussed above in section 3.3. Is there space for
them to create and make a living; to operate within sustainable local markets
without having to pursue unlimited growth; to not be excluded from the
urban cultural fruits of their activities by highly capitalised branded
consumption? These quite basic questions are situated right at the heart of
contemporary concerns about the principles of unlimited accumulation, the
opposition to which was one of the most basic tenets of the aesthetic (and
social) opposition to capitalism. 
73
It is almost commonplace to seek the roots of modern consumption in the
counter-culture, underlined by the rise of the ‘bourgeois-bohemians’ (Frank,
1997; Brooks, 2000). We should see them as real aspirations diverted,
bought-off, buried (Binkley, 2007). The imperative to ‘change life’ remains.
The increased profile of design as a distinct set of skills and socio-political
responsibilities is certainly one area in which the accommodation of
aesthetics and consumption is being both exploited and challenged.  Rather
than (re)package products for consumption, wider social, political and
environmental issues are made ever more explicit.  How we might live
better together is a central trope of left modernism which is also in the
process of re-asserting itself (Hatherley, 2008). 
Cultural policy cannot simply help re-tool a creative workforce. The elision of
art and industry, culture and economics in much creative industries
discourse is a false unity. Modernity is divided, at conflict with itself. Art and
culture share in this world where ‘all that is solid melts into air’; they try to
make sense of it, though they often contribute to its uncertainties. To fold
them into a smooth reconciliation with economic growth is both undesirable
and, if we look all around us, unfeasible.
Modernity has held out possibilities of change; but who the winners and
losers are in those changes is one of the key political questions of
modernity. The rapid acceleration of change and capital’s mobilisation of all
aspects of life as fuel for this has been increasingly disruptive. More than
ever it cuts against the attempts of individuals and communities to fix a
place, give it significance, give it value as this life. Culture has been both a
central stake and a tool in these struggles. It remains so, if we can only grab
it back.
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